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Abstract 
Divided countries pursue reunification. Reunification can give unified countries many 
benefits such as security, reconciliation of the people, and economic profits. However, every 
reunification does not guarantee these benefits. Rather, reunification could produce a civil 
war and economic collapse. In these regards, the process of reunification is very critical in 
order to fulfill the intended purpose of reunification.  
Reunification can be categorized in three categories of its process. Absorptive 
reunification by compulsion, absorptive reunification by negotiation and consensual 
reunification in equal status, are the three models of reunification. The typical examples of 
absorptive reunification, the Vietnam and Germany cases, produced many problems. 
Yemen’s case looks like the desirable model of reunification as kind of consensual 
reunification in equal status, but sudden reunification can be a hardship for the unified 
country. Therefore, a gradual time dimension should be added.  
Cyprus has tried the model of gradual consensual reunification in equal status. The Annan 
Plan is a text book example of desirable reunification. In this regard, Cyprus offers valuable 
lessons for Korea, especially, through the experience of their failure.  
The main reasons for rejection of the referendum are the stationing of foreign forces, 
sharing of political power, new Turkish settlers, property issues, and guidance of political 
leaders. The critical reason why the Annan Plan was rejected by Greek Cypriots was lack of 
preparation. Korea can learn precious lessons from these reasons of rejection and better know 
what Korea should do to prepare for reunification.  
Korea should have strong will for reunification, and exert all possible effort in order to 
accomplish real reconciliation between the people of North and South Korean. Only when the 
two Koreas united firmly, can Korea determine its fate itself. 
 III 
Ö ZET 
Bölünmüş ülkeler yeniden birleşmenin izlerini takip ederler. Yeniden birleşme, birleşik 
ülkelere ekonomik kazanç, ulusal halkın uzlaşması ve güvenlik gibi birçok fayda sağlayabilir. 
Ancak, her yeni birleşme bu faydaları sağlayacağını garanti etmez. Aksine, yeniden birleşme 
ekonomik çöküş ve savaş ortamı çıkarabilir. Bu bakımdan, yeniden birleşme süreci, 
beklenilen birleşmenin amacını karşılamak olduğundan dolayı bu süreç oldukça kritiktir. 
 Yeniden birleşme kendi içerisinde üç kategoriye ayrılabilir. Zorlamaya dayalı emici 
yeniden birleşme, anlaşmaya varmalı emici yeniden birleşme ve eşit statülerdeki karşılıklı 
anlaşmaya varmalı yeniden birleşme, yeniden birleşmenin üç modelidir. Vietnam ve Almanya 
vakası birçok problemi ortaya çıkarmıştır. Yemen vakası ise eşit statülerdeki karşılıklı 
anlaşmaya dayalı yeniden birleme modeli olarak arzu edilen bir yeniden birleşme modeli gibi 
görünüyor but ani yeniden birleşmeler, birleşmiş ülkelerin zorluğu olabilir. Böylece, kademeli 
zaman boyutunun eklenmesi gerekmektedir.  
Kıbrıs, eşit statülerde karşılıklı anlaşmaya dayalı yeniden birleşme modelini denemiştir. 
The Annan Plan, arzu edilen yeniden birleşmeyi anlatan bir ders kitabı örneğidir. Bu 
bağlamda, Kıbrıs, Kore için, özellikle, kendi başarısızlıklarının tecrübelerinin üzerinden paha 
biçilemez dersler sunmaktadır. Referandumun reddedilmesinin sebepleri; politik liderlerin 
yönlendirmeleri, mülkiyet konuları, yeni Türk yerleşimciler, politik gücün paylaşımı ve dış 
mihrakların ikamesidir. Yunan asıllı Kıbrıslılar tarafından reddedilen Annan Planının 
reddedilmesinin başlıca nedeni hazırlıksız olmalarıdır. Kore, iyi bilmesi gereken yeniden 
birleşme için ne çeşit hazırlık yapması gerektiğini daha iyi bilmeli ve bu karşı çıkma 
nedenlerinden çok faydalı dersler çıkarabilir.  
 Kore’nin yeniden birleşme için güçlü bir isteğinin olması ve Kuzey ve Güney Koreli 
insanlar arasında gerçek uzlaşmayı başarmak için bütün olası çabaların öne sürülmesi 
gerekmektedir. Ne zaman ki, iki Kore tamamıyla birleşirse, o zaman kendi kaderlerini 
belirleyecektir. 
 IV 
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Introduction 
 
A nation can be divided by nationalism or different ideologies, and divided countries can be 
also united by military force or political negotiation. According to this natural law, there are 
several movements of reunification in the present international society, too.  
 
Countries Parts Year of Division 
Korea 
Korea = South Korea (Republic of Korea) 
North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) 
1945 
China 
Taiwan (Republic of China) 
China (People’s Republic of China) 
1949 
Cyprus 
South Cyprus (Republic of Cyprus) 
North Cyprus (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus) 
1974 
UK 
Republic of Ireland 
North Ireland 
United Kingdom 
 
1919-21 
*I excluded “Supranational union”1 and Continental union2 which is not reunification. 
 
Also, humanity has experienced several unifications in modern history and the typical 
examples of reunification are the three following cases.   
 
1) German reunification in 1990, divided since the 1949 division decided at the Potsdam 
Conference in August 1945.  
2) Vietnam reunification at the end of the Vietnam War in 1976, divided since 1954 
3) Yemen reunification (1990), divided since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 
 
Interestingly, each case has different process of reunification and the results of reunification 
are obviously different. There are several presently divided countries which are struggling to 
accomplish reunification, but the countries which are pursuing it openly are Korea and 
Cyprus. Korea and Cyprus are taking further steps for reunification than China and UK. 
                                           
1 Supranational union is a type of multi-national confederation, where negotiated power is delegated to an authority by 
governments of member states. The concept of supranational union is sometimes used to describe the European Union, 
as a new type of political entity. Kimmo Kiljunen, “The European Constitution in the Making”. Centre for European Policy 
Studies. 2004, pp. 21–26. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/32581/1/20._EU_Constitution.pdf 
2 A continental union is an inter-governmental, supra-national, or a federation of member states located in the same 
continent, or close to it 
 ２ 
Except for the ethnic composition, Cyprus and Korea have many points in common. Korea 
has been divided since 1945 and Cyprus since 1974. Both countries have gone through the 
interference of foreign powers and the tragedy of civil war. For divided countries, the talk of 
reunification comes up habitually. Especially, the people who live in divided countries for 
several decades, consider instinctively that reunification is what should be happen. However, 
we should not forget reunification has the possibility of being poison as well as honey for 
people. The three countries of Germany, Vietnam and Yemen have accomplished their 
reunification, but the results of reunification were different because the types and processes 
of reunification were different. 
At this stage, it is very important for Cyprus and Korea to choose which model of 
reunification is proper and how it should be accomplished. This question is very natural and 
is a basic problem which divided countries are facing. However, they rarely think how they 
should accomplish reunification or what they can get from it. In other words, although they 
have a strategic objective, they do not have a definite tactic. Additionally, they do not know 
what they should do for reunification as the people, and do not want to accept any loss or 
sacrifice for reunification.  
The people of divided countries have to know the reason for wanting reunification and 
the right way of accomplishing it. After this process of thinking, we can find critical lessons 
from other countries’ cases, especially from the case of Cyprus. Cyprus has very important 
experience through the Annan Plan. In my thesis, I would like to elucidate why Korea should 
pay attention its notice to the Annan Plan over other cases such as Germany, and what we 
should learn from the failure of the Annan Plan. 
 ３ 
Chapter 1: Purpose of Reunification 
What do we expect to get from the reunification? This question is the key that tells the 
desirable way of reunification. Above all, we should know why reunification should be 
accomplished, and then we have to find the way that can fulfill the purposes of reunification.  
 
1.1 Security 
Security means “absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear 
that such values will be attacked.”3 It is natural that Security becomes a critical issue for any 
country. “Generally speaking, security issues are classified into traditional security issues and 
non-traditional security issues or new security threats. In a broad sense, traditional security 
issues deal with war and peace. To put it in concrete terms, traditional issues are caused by 
military, political and diplomatic conflicts.”4 Even if we do not consider the non-traditional 
issue, security is a very critical issue relating to people’s life, property, sovereignty, 
maintenance of territory integrity and so on. A divided country’s security is always 
threatened by their opposite part. Korea is the very typical case which shows how divided 
country’s security can be seriously threatened. For divided countries, reunification is the only 
way to exclude the threat in security issue arising from division.  
 
1.1.1 Elimination of Military Conflict 
Above all, reunification can eliminate the military conflict between divided parts. Korea has 
had numerous military conflicts since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Even excluding the 
victims of the Korean War, numerous civilians and soldiers have died because of the divided 
                                           
3 Prabhakaran Paleri, ‘National Security: Imperatives And Challenges’, Tata McGraw-Hill Education, 2008, p52  
4 Tong Hui Ma, “Reunification of Korea is a Major Security Issue on the Korean Peninsula”, Institute for Security and 
Development Policy, 2010, p.15, Available at 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISDP_ReunificationofKoreaisaMajorSecurityIssueontheKoreanPenins
ula_TheNorthKoreanPerspective.pdf 
 ４ 
situation. Through the cases which Korea has experienced, namely the seriousness of military 
conflict, the inevitable necessity of reunification becomes obvious. 
 
Major Military Conflicts in Korea 
The raid of Cheong-Wa-Dae, the president’s residence(1968);  
North Korean special forces platoon of 31soliders infiltrated Seoul to kill VIPs in the 
government. 
 
The hijacking of a passenger airplane(1969) 
A South Korean civil aircraft was hijacked to North Korea. 51 people on board were 
released after 2 months, except 12 people. They are being detained until now. 
 
The assassination of First Lady(1974) 
One North Korean terrorist tried to kill the President, Park-Jeong-Hee, but failed. A stray 
shot killed First Lady. 
 
The bomb terror of Myanmar(1983) 
An attempt to kill South Korea President visiting Myanmar failed. 17 VIPs in government 
died including the vice prime minister. 
 
Blasting of passenger airplane(1987) 
A North Korean woman agent blew up the KAL858 airplane.  
All passengers 115 died.  
 
2
nd
 Yeon-Peong Battle(2002) 
South Korean Navy engaged with North Korean Navy who crossed the border. 19 died, 25 
wounded, the North Korean patrol boat sank. 
 
Cheon-An-warship Sink(2010) 
South Korean warship was sunk by torpedo in the South Korean territorial water. 40 people 
were killed. 
 
Bombardment of Yeon-Pyeong, a Korean island (2010) 
On 24, Nov, 2010, North Korea shelled dozens of artilleries on the South Korean island and 
4 people died including 2 civilians. 
These are not all of conflicts between South and North Korea. The security of Korea is being 
threatened endlessly by the divided situation. These threats should be eliminated as soon as 
possible, and it is a matter of course that unification is the best way to eliminate these 
conflicts. 
 ５ 
1.1.2 Independence from Stationing of Foreign Force  
Divided situation infringes upon sovereignty by giving foreign powers chances to intervene. 
Generally, countries divided by foreign power cannot escape from the intervention of foreign 
powers. Turkish, Greek, UN Peace Keeping military forces and British military are stationed 
in Cyprus. The USA and UN are stationed in South Korea. The stationing of foreign force is 
not only a problem of defense, but also an infringement of sovereignty. Korea needs US 
military aid in order to prevent a civil war with North Korea, but the stationing of US military 
fetters South Korea. The South Korean situation shows well the reasons why divided 
countries both need the stationing of foreign forces and how the sovereignty of divided 
countries is infringed by foreign forces.  
Firstly, South Korea has not had the right of military operational control since 1950. 
This means that Korea cannot decide its own security issues. Although operational control in 
peace time was transferred to South Korea in 1994, operational control in wartime will be 
transferred to South Korea in 2015. This means that even though South Korea has the 
Ministry of Defense and its own forces, the South Korean president cannot control the army. 
The reason unification should be accomplished is that divided countries are able to decide 
their fate themselves, rather than it decided for us by foreign force.  
Secondly, in order to keep the stationing of foreign force, divided countries are made to 
accept many unfair treaties. For example, Korea and USA, SOFA (Status of Forces 
Agreement) could be considered as an unfair treaty, because USA soldiers have a privilege in 
the process of criminal law and Korean jurisdiction cannot deal with them justly. Finally, a 
criminal can go back to USA without any penalty. Nevertheless, South Korea cannot help 
depending on the USA forces, even though “South Korean ranking of military strength is 7th 
in the world.”5 North Korea is 22th, it is not important how strong our military power is, 
because in ten minutes, war can deprive everything that South Korea has constructed since 
1953. The only way to achieve absolute security is through reunification.  
                                           
5 Global Fire Power, “Military ranking strength of world”, 2011, Available at http://www.globalfirepower.com/ 
 ６ 
1.2 Historical Compatriots and Dispersed Family Member 
Another reason for accomplishing reunification is that the divided, people had lived together 
before they were divided. It does not mean only one ethnic group. They lived together and 
married each other and were members of same social community, but now, due to national 
division, they can no longer meet each other at their own will. In South Korea, there were 
“128,698 dispersed family members because of Korean War. Among these people, 50,480”6 
are already dead because of old age.  
[Data of Dispersed Family Members by family relationship] 
Items Husband or Wife 
Parents or Offspring
Brothers or 
Sisters
Relatives Total
Number(person) 36,181 31,198 10,838 78,218
7
 
As you can see from this data, about 78,218 people cannot have met their father, mother, son, 
daughter and spouse since 1953. To make matters worse, most of dispersed family members 
are very old so, they cannot wait any longer for reunification. There cannot be a more tragic 
thing than family that cannot meet due to ideology. For these people, security or expense of 
unification is not important. They are eager for the realization of unification before they die. 
In the case of Cyprus, there are also “1,619 missing people”8. This missing people issue 
cannot be also solved before unification. 
                                           
6 Korean Ministry of Unification, “Data of dispersed family”, March. 2012, Available at 
https://reunion.unikorea.go.kr/reunion/jsp/user/ud/udl0101V?q_idx=173&q_section=REQUEST&q_argKeyGubun=&q_arg
KeyWord=&currentSN= 
7 Ibid. 
8 Organization of Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons of Cyprus, “Data of Dispersed Family Members 
by Family Relationship”, Available at http://www.missing.cy.org.cy/index-3.html 
 ７ 
1.3 Economic Benefits  
In the aspect of economy, the effect of reunification is more complicated than any other 
aspects, because it depend on the type and process of reunification whether the new unified 
state can get economic benefits or not.  
First of all, the territory can be extended by reunification. The total territory of Cyprus is 
“9,251 sq. kilometers”9, but “the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) covers only 
an area of 3,355 square kilometers.”10 “The total area of Korea is 223,000 square kilometers, 
and South Korea covers an area of 100,210 square kilometers.”11 Moreover, the population 
density of South Korea is very high; 489 in 1 square kilometers.
12
 Unified Korea would 
double its area of present territory. It is obvious that the wider territory will be great benefits 
to South Korea. 
Secondly, the extension of territory does not mean only change of land area, but also the 
change of all aspect of life on the territory, especially the economic sector. The extension of 
economic territory produces the new scale of economy with the extension of market, the 
innovation of marketing distribution structure, the acquisition of new labor, extension of farm 
land, development of marine product industry through the extension of EEZ, acquisition of 
natural resources and so forth. However, on the other hand, the extension of economic scale 
does not guarantee directly economic benefits, and has the possibility of being a disaster for 
both unified parts. There can be a rapidly increasing unemployment rate, inflation, the 
collapse of basic industry, and so on. Nevertheless, the natural tendency is that reunification 
produce immense economic benefit.  
                                           
9 Cyprus Government Web Portal, “the gross area of Cyprus”, Available at 
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/9E78C19E842F1DD9C2256ED60038B3BA?OpenDocument 
10 TRNC Government Web Portal, Available at http://www.cyprusive.com/default.asp?CID=1 
11 Data by Korean Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime affair; Hanguk Daily News, 3th, April, 2010, Available at 
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201004/h2010042306031751380.htm 
12 Korean Statics Bureau 2009, http://www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxMain.jsp?idx_cd=1007 
 ８ 
Thirdly, a newly unified state can switch over excessive defense budgets to other things 
such as economic development. “South Korea spent about $ 28 billion in 2010 for defense”13 
and “North Korea spent $ 7.7 billion in the defense sector in 2009.”14 “Although the data of 
North Korean data are hardly ever gotten, ROK’s Defense White Paper 2008 estimated that 
more than 30 percent of North Korea’s gross national income (GNI) went to the defense 
sector in 2007”15 The amount of defense spending is not only an economic problem, it is 
related on the people’s right to live as well. In spite of continuing economic hardship, North 
Korea has rapidly increased its defense spending since 1998. While increasing their defense 
budget, the North Korean people are starving to death. According to WFP (World Food 
Program), “20~34% of North Korean people are suffering from starvation by 2011.”16 “A 
survey of people along the China-North Korea border suggests that, since January 1997, an 
average of about 15 percent of the people in numerous towns and villages have died from the 
famine which has plagued North Korea for more than a year.”17 The number of dead people 
mounts up to 3 million. The main reason for this tragedy is the reality of division. North and 
South Korea can stop this arms race through the reunification.  
                                           
13 Gi-jung Joo, “Defense White Paper (various issues) 2010”, Jung-Ang Daily Newspaper, 20 Jan, 2011, Available at 
http://interactive.joinsmsn.com/article.html?sid=366&cloc=joongang|home|newslist1 
14 Sung-man Kim “Is the Korean Defense Budget proper?”, Korean National Security Net, 20 Jan. 2012, Available at 
http://www.konas.net/article/article.asp?idx=27608 
15 Chung-in Moon and Sang-keun Lee, “Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula”, Asian Perspective, 
Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, p.82 
16 WFP(World Food Programme), “Hunger Map”, 2011, http://www.wfp.org/hunger/map 
17  Suk Lee, “North Korean Famine”, Korea Institute of National Unification, 2004, p. 3 Available at 
http://www.kinu.or.kr/report/report_01_01.jsp?page=1&num=521&mode=view&field=&text=&order=&dir=&bid=DATA02&s
es=&category=6 
 ９ 
Chapter 2: Desirable Reunification Model 
If only the reunification is accomplished, does the reunification guarantee the benefits 
mentioned above? The answer is ‘No’. Reunification can be either a blessing for the people 
or a tragic disaster. Reunification can cause civil war, or it can also eliminate the military 
conflict absolutely. Now, it is a necessary step to find the reason why the result of unification 
is different. Although it is quite natural, the result can be changed by the difference of process. 
The result of unification depends on the process of reunification, that is, the model of 
unification.  
 
2.1 Classification of Reunification Model 
Unification can be categorized into “three models”18 by its method and status of each part. 
Classification of Unification 
 
Item 
Status of each part 
Equal Absorptive 
 
 
Method of 
unification 
Negotiation Consensual Unification 
in equal status 
Absorptive Unification 
by negotiation 
Compulsory X Absorptive unification 
by compulsion  
19
 
Firstly, each part in the process of unification can have equal or unequal status in economic, 
political and military power. While, in absorptive unification, usually one part is merged by 
the other stronger part, in the case of unification in equal status, each part shares the political, 
economic, and military power.  
Unification can also be categorized by the method of unification. One is consensual 
reunification by negotiations, another is a compulsory reunification by repressive measures.  
                                           
18 I referred the three models of reunification which are used by Yang-Ju Kwon who is one specialist of Korean institute of 
Ministry Defense, Yang-Ju Kwon, “Discussion of unification and desirable South North Korean unification method”, 
Korean Institute for Defense Analysis, Annual Report, 2011, Available at 
http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2011/05/09/%C1%A61357%28%B1%C7%BE%E7%C1%D6_%BB%E7%C1%F8.pdf 
19 Ibid, p.2 
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The consensual reunification is generally accomplished by long and numerous diplomatic 
meetings, while the compulsory unification is generally accomplished by military invasion or 
threat. The important thing is which model is proper to accomplish the purpose of unification 
such as the elimination of military conflict, the acquisition of economic benefits and the 
absolute reconciliation of people. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize which reunification 
model is desirable to fulfill the purpose of reunification. 
 
2.1.1 Absorptive Unification by Compulsion 
Absorptive unification by compulsion is accomplished through repressive measures such as 
military invasion, without agreements or negotiations. In this case, militarily or economically 
superior side absorbs the other into its dominion. One representative example is Vietnam War. 
If I explain the process of Vietnam Unification, it is as follows: 
 
“As a result of the Second Indochina War (1954–75), Viet Cong—communist 
forces in South Vietnam—and regular People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces 
from the North unified Vietnam under communist rule. After the withdrawal of the 
last U.S. forces in 1973, Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, fell to the 
communists, and on April 30, 1975, the South Vietnamese army surrendered. In 
1976 the government of united Vietnam renamed Saigon as Ho Chi Minh City, in 
honor of the wartime communist leader who died in September 1969. The 
Vietnamese estimate that they lost nearly 3 million lives and suffered more than 4 
million injuries during the U.S. involvement in the war.” 20 
As everyone knows, this is the worst case among the models of reunification. This 
reunification model cannot accomplish most of the purposes of reunification, except the 
territorial merge and few parts of economic benefits. Each part, even the winner has 
economic losses and numerous lives, because of war. Above all, the united state is not stable 
as they cannot accomplish a true national reconciliation. They are prone to have a civil war 
again if the winning side becomes weak.  
                                           
20  “Country Profile: Vietnam”, December 2005, Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, Available at 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Vietnam.pdf 
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2.1.2 Absorptive Unification by Negotiation 
This case means that although the unification is achieved by negotiations, one side is 
absorbed by the other superior side. In reality, this model does not have the normal process of 
negotiation, because the main cause of this reunification is the collapse of one side.  
The case of the German reunification accomplished by the collapse of East Germany is 
typical case of absorptive unification by negotiation. The process of German reunification is 
as follows: 
 
“Germany commemorates the process of reunification that was formally concluded with 
the accession of the GDR (German Democratic Republic, East Germany) to the Federal 
Republic on 3 October 1990. This process began in the summer of 1989. Encouraged by 
the perestroika policy of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, demands for change were 
also voiced in the GDR. Growing numbers of refugees and a lack of willingness on the 
part of the GDR government to reform created growing impatience among GDR 
citizens. From 4 September on demands for change were voiced publicly. The so-called 
'Monday Demonstrations' began in Leipzig. Peaceful demonstrations of this kind were 
soon being held throughout the GDR. The demand of the people for more participation 
and democracy was expressed in their chant: ‘We are the people!’. On 18 October Erich 
Honecker resigned from office as GDR State Council Chairman and Secretary-General 
of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany, German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands). As a consequence of the largest demonstration, held on Berlin on 4 
November, the entire GDR government resigned on 7 November. Two days later, on 9 
November 1989, the Wall came down.” 21 
 
The problem with this case is the enormous burden of reunification responsibility. The 
unified government should clear off the blunder of the collapsed past government. Like the 
German case, if one part absorbs the other part due to an economic gap, the unified 
government will inherit an immense economic burden in efforts to balance the economic 
parts. Before German reunification, many specialists worried and alerted the government to 
                                           
21 Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany London, “A short history of German reunification” Available at 
http://www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/01/Feste/Tag__der__Deutschen__Einheit/History__of__reunification__s
eite.html 
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the economic crisis. “One of these was to raise enormous amounts of credit, which should be 
taken up with the Federal Republic of Germany. Another alert was to restructure the labor 
force potential to eliminate disparities between productive and unproductive forces.”22 These 
warning became reality. Unemployed workers increased by geometrical progression. In this 
model of reunification, it takes a long time in order to fulfill the purpose of reunification. 
Some people are apt to complain about the reunification. One opinion poll (2009) shows well 
these problems that the German reunification caused: 
 
“More than 70 percent of East Germans are unhappy with their economic 
situation. Almost as many people do not expect any future improvement. About 80 
percent complain about the lack of social justice. More than half think that the levels 
of social security and medical services were higher during GDR times. More than 50 
percent of citizens are unhappy with their newly won democracy. Only 22 percent 
feel that they have become full citizens of the Federal Republic. 64 percent feel like 
second-class citizens, 73 percent feel disadvantaged” 23  
 
This shows that absorptive reunification causes many problems and cannot be the desirable 
model, even if the reunification is accomplished by peaceful means.  
 
2.1.3 Consensual Unification in Equal Status 
This reunification is accomplished by negotiations in equal status. Generally, they share the 
political power by agreements or elect new leaders by general election. The 1
st
 reunification 
of Yemen in 1990 can be one example of this case: 
                                           
22 Rainer Eppelmann, “Germany’s Unification: Prospects, Problems, and Challenges of the German Unification in 
Economics and Society 20 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall”, Address in the Berlin International Economics Congress 
(BIEC) in 4th. February, 2010, p.2 
23 Werner Kamppeter, “Conceivable lessons from the German unification miracle”, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Seoul/2009, 
p. 8 
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“The Republic of Yemen was declared on 22 May 1990. In October 1987, a 
senior government official in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) declared that 
‘except by some historic accident, unity [with South Yemen] will only come about 
over a long period of time’. Less than three years later, on May 22nd 1990, the 
governments of the YAR and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) 
took almost everyone by surprise by announcing formal political unification. 
Although it was true that the two states had been engaged in detailed negotiations 
over the mechanics of integration for several years, few expected these difficult, 
perhaps existential questions, to have been resolved with such speed.” 24 
 
Some might say that this model could be the desirable model of unification, but Yemen’s 
reunification failed. There is one important point that should be noticed. It is the time 
dimension. That is, how much they had prepared for the reunification and how much they had 
endeavored in order to decrease the shock. Yemen accomplished reunification too quickly, 
without giving the people and the governmental system a chance to prepare. There was no 
communication with the people so the reunification came to them as a surprise. The sudden 
unity of Yemen could not help being broken by small impact. The re-division came from 
friction with Saudi Arabia.  
 
“The newly unified nation faced political crisis when an estimated 800,000 Yemeni 
people and overseas workers were sent home by Saudi Arabia following Yemen's 
decision not to support Coalition forces in the Gulf War. Remittances from these 
workers, an important part of the economy, were slashed and many Yemenis were 
placed in refugee camps while the government decided where to house them and 
how to re-integrate them into the workforce. The repatriation of these Yemenis 
immediately increased the nation's population by 7%.”25 
 
This case shows that desirable reunification requires much time and preparation. Finally, I 
can suggest one desirable model of unification from these three cases.  
                                           
24 Sharif Ismail, “Unification in Yemen, Dynamics of Political Integration”, Thesis, College University of Oxford, 2008, p.10, 
Available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/Ismail%20Thesis.pdf 
25 Foad Hisham, “the Effect of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances”, San Diego State University, 2009, p.2, 
Available at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~hfoad/GulfMigration_v1.pdf 
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2.2 Reconstructing a Desirable Reunification Model  
from the Problems of Each Case 
Absorptive reunification has problems regardless of its method. The last model of 
reunification is consensual reunification in equal status, but it can also fail by unexpected 
factors. Consequently, another factor should be added in consideration of desirable 
reunification. From the Yemen and German case, it becomes to be obvious the fact that an 
abrupt influx of refugee or a sudden integration of economies can be disastrous. Eventually, 
the dimension of time should be considered for a desirable reunification model. Every model 
can have two characteristics in the dimension of time, a radical process and a gradual process. 
Although the definite standard of gradual process and radical process cannot be presented, the 
meaning of gradual can be better understood by considering the different integration process. 
In the process of territorial integration, there can be, simultaneously, territorial unity and a 
slow-and-steady regional integration. In the first step of political integration, a loose 
confederative system or unitary system can be taken. Through this comparison, Gradual 
Concept can be definite in the categorization of reunification. Gradual unification requires 
more time, more negotiation, and examination of problems that can arise in the process of 
reunification.  
Categorization of Reunification Added the Time Dimension 
     
26
 
                                           
26 Kwon, supra note 18, p.4 
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Consequently, the desirable unification type which can fulfill the purpose of unification 
is gradual consensual unification in equal status. North and South Korea should pursue the 
gradual consensual unification in equal status. Like the German case, a sudden collapse of 
North Korea cannot ever be helpful. North and South Korea must maintain negotiations and 
have tolerance to proceed for unification step by step. Now, it should be definite how we can 
accomplish the model of gradual consensual reunification in equal status. 
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2.3 Cyprus Case as a Desirable Model of Reunification 
The two Koreas have negotiated numerous times since 1953, but talks have been fruitless.  
Negotiations between the North and South have repeatedly been stopped and started by 
international environment. Even the meeting of dispersed family members is not settled yet. 
There were only two times of summit conference; in 2000, President Dae-jung Kim and in 
2007, Mu-hyeon Rho visited North Korea. The result of these summits was just abstract 
propaganda. The two Koreas should draw concrete and particular agreements in the process 
of gradual consensual unification in equal status, in order to get the benefits of reunification. 
Consequently, the two Koreas are the going wrong way for gradual consensual reunification. 
    Now, it needs to find any example of gradual consensual unification in equal status in 
the world. Finally, among divided countries in present world, Cyprus could be considered as 
such a model. Although Cyprus has also not accomplished its reunification and is walking a 
thorny path towards unification, it is a living specimen that shows the prolonged and difficult 
process of gradual consensual reunification. Just as Korea negotiated for a very long time, 
Cyprus has negotiated since 1974. 
It is also a very rare case in that a 3
rd
 part, the UN has taken a very active role in the 
reunification of Cyprus. Especially in that Cyprus has the set of documents in the Annan plan 
that shows the process of gradual consensual unification. The Annan Plan, revised so many 
times, through negotiation, is a key in illustrating how the gradual consensual reunification 
goes ahead. Moreover, the 2004 referendum of Cyprus explains what problems negotiation 
conducted through representatives have. The reasons for rejection of the Annan Plan tell us 
what is the previous problems in the process need to be solved. 
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Comparison of Korea & Cyprus 
Questions Korea War Cyprus War 
Independence 1945 from Japan 1960 from Britain 
Division 
1948 by divided occupation of USA 
and USSR 
1974  
By Turkish intervention or invasion* 
Civil War 
In 1950, North Korea supported by 
USSR, invaded South Korea. USA 
and UN(16 countries) intervened.  
In 1974, Greek Cypriots oppresed 
Turkish Cyprus through coup de’tat. 
Turkey intervened  
Aftermath of War 
In 1953, Two Koreas made an 
arimistice and were divided until 
now 
In 1974, Turkey occupied 36% of 
territory and Green line was set up 
and divied until now 
Status of each part 
North and South Korea 
simultaneously entered in UN in 
1991 
Republic of Cyprus is a member of 
UN. TRNC is not member of UN
27
  
 *I used the terms both ‘intervention’ and ‘invasion’ which two sides have debated.  
 
 
                                           
27 UN does not recognize Northern Cyprus as a sovereign state, but recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus 
over the whole island. United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Australia have representation offices in 
Northern Nicosia. 
 １８ 
Chapter 3: Annan Plan and Referenda 
The Annan Plan is the proposal of the UN to resolve the problem of a divided Cyprus. The 
name of the proposal came from the Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan. He tried to reunite the 
Republic of Cyprus (South Cyprus) and TRNC (North Cyprus) through negotiation. The 
Annan Plan was revised a number of times before being put to the people of Cyprus in a 
referendum. It was opposed by leaders in the south and voters in the south rejected it, 
although voters in the north voted for it. 
Even though the Annan Plan was rejected in the end, as I mentioned above, it has critical 
meanings for discerning a desirable model of reunification. In the process of Annan Plan, 
there were debates and efforts to conclude an agreement, and their negotiation was repeated 
to stop and restart with the interests of each part. Domestic politic situation and the 
international environment also influenced the Annan Plan. Needless to repeat, this whole of 
the negotiation process is the text book for gradual consensual reunification in equal status. In 
this chapter, it will be explained about the backgrounds of the Annan Plan’s beginning, the 
process of revision, and the result of referendum.  
 
3.1 Genesis of the Annan Plan 
 
3.1.1 New Environment for Negotiation 
Although the intervention of third parties generally cause more complicated problems 
because third parties try to get some benefits from the divided situation, but when divided 
countries are conflicting seriously, the arbitration of third parties can play an important role 
in the beginnings of negotiation. In 1999, the UN started a new initiative for solving the 
Cyprus conflict. There were some important changes of the international environment. It can 
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be summarized in three points.  
“• The Cold War-like relations between Turkey and Greece had begun to thaw. 
 
• The EU had started membership application talks with Cyprus. Although the Helsinki 
EU Council in 1999 had decided that a unification of Cyprus was not a precondition 
for an accession, it was hoping for a unification of Cyprus before the end of the 
accession negotiations. 
 
• In the same EU-Council meeting Turkey was accepted as an EU candidate country 
with several political preconditions that had to be met before accession negotiations 
could start. The new UN efforts were supported especially by the EU and by the USA. 
The latter were highly interested in an EU membership perspective for Turkey.” 28 
 
The end of the Cold War and EU accession were all that could be desired to start a 
negotiation. Negotiation can be performed only when each part can gain something. Foreign 
powers interested in divided country also give divided parties the right of independent 
negotiation, only when they can get other profits such as EU accession for Turkey. The new 
international environment was turning point for the Cyprus Problem. 
 
3.1.2 Pains of Annan Plan’s Birth 
The Annan Plan was started by the “G-8”29. On 20 June 1999, the G-8 started to put pressure 
on Kofi Annan to solve the Cyprus Problem. Firstly, the G-8 urged Kofi Annan to mediate 
between Turkey, Greece and the two Cypriots communities in order to have direct 
negotiations. “Both parties should commit to set no pre-conditions, put all issues on the table, 
and negotiate in good faith until a settlement would be reached and to take full consideration 
of relevant UN resolutions and treaties.”30 Having good faith and no pre-conditions might 
                                           
28 Jerry Sommer, “Security in Cyprus: Threat Perceptions, Possible Compromises and the Role of the EU”, Bonn 
International Center for Conversion”, 2005, p.18 
29 A forum for the governments of eight of the world's largest economies. (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Canada, Russia) 
30 Frank Hoffmeister, “Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and EU Accession”, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006, p.101 
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look plain and obvious, but there is nothing more important to resolution that the beginnings 
of negotiation, because all divided countries have their preconditions which hamper a start to 
negotiations. Besides, Cyprus had an arbitrator that Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkey 
and Greece could all accept. The UN as judge put the players in the ring of negotiation and 
informed them of the basic rule of negotiation, Resolution 1250.  
 
 
31
  
This resolution 1250 remained the basis for the negotiations during the crucial period. It 
effectively left discretion to the UN Secretary-General to conduct the process. After this 
                                           
31 UN internet site, “Resolution 1250 (1999)”, S/RES/1250 (1999) 22 December, 1999, http://www.un.int/cyprus/scr1250.htm 
 ２１ 
preparation of negotiation, the two community leaders met 5 times. The process of meeting is 
as follows: 
 
“In the first round of proximity talks (3 December- 14 December 1999) the UN 
explored the positions of the parties. The second round (31 January - 8 
February 2000) took place in Geneva. The results were limited given the fact 
that presidential elections were scheduled in TRNC (which Denktaş eventually 
won). The third round was held in Geneva (4 July – 4 August, 2000) without 
any significant discussion of substance between the parties. Accordingly the 
UN decided to become more active. UN presented its preliminary thoughts on 
the four core issues: territory, property, security and constitution.”32 
 
From this stage, their first promise was broken. Turkish Cypriots insisted on political equal 
status, that is, the recognition of TRNC. Although they had two more meeting (4th: 12-16 
September 2000, 5th 31 October-10 November), the negotiation was broken off.    
Throughout 2001, the UN had made efforts in order to resume negotiations. The change of 
mood in negotiations came from Denktaş.  
“Denktaş had been reluctant to resume the negotiation, and then Denktaş 
started new initiatives to overcome the negative picture in international public 
opinion that he was obstructionist. He wrote to Annan and Clerides, and both 
leaders met at the Ledra palace on 4 December 2001. Since January 2002, two 
leaders negotiated with the core issues and on 2 May 2002, the members of the 
Security Council expressed the view that the time had now come to set down 
on paper areas of common ground between the two sides.” 33 
 
However, two conflicting parties could not write any agreement papers themselves. Finally, 
UN Secretary-General Annan unveiled his ideas for a settlement on 11 November 2002. This 
is Annan I.    
                                           
32 Hoffmeister, supra note 30, p.104 
33 Hoffmeister, supra note 30, pp107~117 
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3.2 Annan Plan I 
Annan I, “the so-called ‘Foundation Agreement’, is split into two parts: ‘Hard’ provisions 
that are not further negotiations, and ‘Soft’ provisions that could be changed by mutual 
agreement no later than 28 February 2003.”34 The Annan Plan I has 4 articles in its main text 
and 5 appendixes. The main content of Annan Plan I is as follows: 
Annan Plan I 
                                           
34 Hoffmeister, supra note 30, p.117 
status,  
sovereignty,  
and continuity 
- New state of affairs in Cyprus referred to as “Cyprus” or the “State of  
Cyprus 
 
- Single international legal personality consisting of two separate states. 
 
- Common state would exercise the constitutional powers allocated  
- No hierarchy between the two levels. 
Foreign affairs 
-EU relations, central-bank functions, common-state finances (to the extent 
relevant), economic and trade policy, aviation and navigation policy, as 
well as some more technical matters, were allocated to the common state. 
 
-The Swiss model for an executive council of the common state (4 Greek 
Cypriots and 2 Turkish Cypriots chosen be each side) requiring agreement 
by at least one member from each side. 
 
-The council would select a president and vice president from among its 
members, rotating every six months with never less than a 2:1 rotation. 
 
- For the first 36 months, Clerides and Denktash would serve as “co-
presidents. 
Parliament 
- The upper house would be divided 50:50  
 
-The lower house would be elected by popular vote, and the share of seats 
could not be less than 25 percent for either side. 
 
- No legislation could be passed without approval of both houses 
 
-To avoid the possibility of a deadlock, and to permit it to break ties in the 
event other institutions deadlocked, a supreme court would be comprised 
of three Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots, and three non-Cypriots. 
Security 
- Neither of the two separate states could secede nor unite with any outside 
state. 
 
-The number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot troops that could 
remain on the island was limited  
 
- Disbanding of all Cypriot forces with removal of arms  
 
- A legally binding arms embargo Island-wide UN-mandated  
international military presence for an indefinite period 
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Kofi Annan suggested this solution to two sides and required their opinions. 
“Complying with Annan’s request, Clerides reacted to the plan on 18 November after having 
consulted within the National Council. He wrote to Annan that he was prepared to negotiate 
on the basis of the proposals and seeking a number of clarifications.”36 On the other hand, 
the Turkish side came to a new turning point. In Turkey’s general elections, the leader of 
AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, the Justice and Development Party), Erdoğan won as the 
single-chamber parliament. He changed the platform for Cyprus, to ‘No solution is not 
solution’. On 27 November, “Denktaş wrote a letter to Annan, expressing his willingness to 
negotiate on the basis of his proposals. Taking into account the technical comments mainly of 
the Greek Cypriot side, Annnan tabled a slightly revised version on 10 Desember 2002, 
Annan II.”37  
                                           
35 David Hannay, “Cyprus : The Search for a Solution”, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 2005, pp.182~185 
36 Hoffmeister, supra note 30, p.120 
37 Ibid, pp.120~121 
Territorial 
adjustment 
- providing for transfer of additional property to Greek Cypriots, enabling 
the return of more Greek Cypriots and displacement of fewer Turkish 
Cypriots, was specified. 
- A “property board” was to be established to handle mutual compensation  
- A moratorium on return was to exist for three years regarding unoccupied 
property and five years for occupied property. 
Citizenship  
- No decision was made regarding post-1974 Turkish immigrants 
- All Cypriots would be Cypriot citizens as well as citizens of their 
respective component states. 
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3.3 Annan Plan II 
The main changes of Annan II were as follows: 
 
Governance 
-The representation of Cyprus in the European Parliament based on 
propotional representation, but 2 out of the 6 seats to the Turkish 
Cypriosts. 
-Co-presidency period was shortened to 2 1/2 years instead of 3 years 
Security 
-The possible number of troops to stay on the island between 
2,500~7,500. 
-The two component states, as well as Greece and Turkey, would need to 
consent to any international military operation in the “new” Cyprus, 
and the required notice to the UN concerning troop movements of the 
residual contingent forces remaining on the island was raised 
Settlers 
Maximum number of 33.000 persons from each side was fixed, the 
conditions as regards naturalization were slightly hardened, while a 
financial assistance scheme for persons who have to leave the island was 
introduced.  
Freedom of  
movement  
and residence 
Any restriction on residence should not prevent the freedom of 
movement through Cyprus, including the right of any Cypriot citizen to 
temporarily stay or holiday in their own properties or other 
accommodation anywhere in Cyprus.  
Natual resources 
Management of natural resources would become a common rather than 
component state responsibility 
38
  
However, the Annan Plan II could also not finish their negotiation. On 11-12 December 2002, 
the two sides had made good progress in the first stage of negotiation, but expectations did 
not come to fruition. “Whereas the Greek Cypriot side was inclined to sign, if the Turkish 
Cypriot side would commit itself in the same way, TRNC did not take a comparable position. 
The Turkish government did not induce the Turkish Cypriots to sign either.”39 The UN put 
pressure upon Turkish leaderships, but Turkish side did not take positive action for the Annan 
Plan. In the meantime, Greek side leaderships suddenly declared that they would have not 
                                           
38 Hoffmeister, supra note 30, p.121, and Hannay, supra note 35, pp.189~191 
39 Ibid, pp.121~123 
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signed to the Annan plan. However, these negative attitudes of politic leaders caused the 
people’s opposition, especially in TRNC. “The inner Turkish Cypriot opposition to the 
Denktaş had occurred in large demonstration with platform ‘This Country is Ours’, and 
people demonstrated for an acceptance of the Annan plan and EU.”40 It is obvious that this 
mood influenced the following, TRNC, presidential election on 27 January 2003. In order to 
avoid the blame for a failed negotiation, Turkish leadership presented another requirement, 
the so-called ‘Basic Requirements for a Settlement in Cyprus’. It contained 6 main points:  
1) “The map had to be renegotiated  
2) A property moratorium should last 9 years 
3) 50,000 Turks should stay in Cyprus for five years in addition to those 
that are legally established there.  
4) One new idea concerned aliens, neither Turks nor Greeks should make 
up more than 5% of aliens in Cyprus.  
5) The one-third of senators of each constituent state would be needed for 
an affirmative vote.  
6) The mandate of UN force should not involve enforcement tasks.”41 
 
The UN examined these requirements of the Turkish side, and revised the Annan Plan. 
Finally, the UN presented a new version, Annan III, on 26 February 2003.  
                                           
40 Hoffmeister, supra note 30, pp.121~123 
41 Ibid, p.125 
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3.4 Annan Plan III 
The characteristics of Annan III could be summarized into the term, ‘Give and Take’. Instead 
of accepting Turkish requirements, the UN also gave some benefits to the Greek side.  
 
 
On 11 March 2003, in the Hague, the leaders met and the progress of agreement looked to be 
going well, but the Annan Plan III faced difficult obstructions. As the Annan Plan II was 
influenced by the TRNC elections, the Annan Plan III was also influenced by the Greek 
elections February 2003. Papadopulos won and his position was changed.  
“His attitude was expected to be cautious, certarinly not enthuasistic about the 
Annan Plan. On the Turkish side, Denktaş conferred with the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Gül, President Sezer and others in Ankara. 
Although details remained consealed, it emerged from this meeting that he had 
gained full support to oppose the plan.” 43 
                                           
42 Hoffmeister, supra note 30, p.126 
43 Ibid, p.129 
“Denomination of State 
- The two constituent states, ‘the Greek Cypriot State’ and ‘the Turkish Cypriot State’  
 
Governance 
- United Cyprus Republic would have a federal government 
- Against foreign judges of Federal Court, a new provision ensured that these should only 
cast decisive vote if the Cypriot judges were not in agreement. 
 
Citizenship 
- two constituent states gained discretionary powers to decide on internal citizenship 
 
Security 
- Not modify the mandate of the future UN force, but any international military operations 
in Cyprus would need the consent of Greece and Turkey as well as of each constituent 
state.  
- Determined The size of Turkish and Greek troops to stay on the island to 6,000 
 
Territory(map) 
- As result of Britain concession (Britain expressed they are willing to conced 45 of the 99 
square miles of the military base not needed for military purposes.), Turkish Cypriot 
State would account of 29.2% of the terrritory, the Greek Cypriot State for 71.8%.  
 
Property and Residence 
- Increased the moratorium to six years 
-Quota of Greek Cypriots living in the north could be restricted to 21% (previous 28%)”
42
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This changed attitude was caused by the possible accession of Turkey in to the EU. 
“Apparently, the AKP government was not decided to give in at this early stage where EU 
assurances on the accession course of Turkey remained uncertain.”44 EU accession was a 
strong motive for reunification, but when the motive became uncertain, Annan III also could 
not help but to be stalled.  
 
3.5 Hard Marching toward the Last Version, Annan Plan V 
The dead line of Cyprus EU accession was coming without certain result. Both sides could 
not help making some agreement to put it to referendum before the deadline. They made 
preliminary contacts in order to restart their negotiation. Furthermore, the situation of TRNC 
was completely changed because of the December 2003 election. In this general election, the 
parties supporting reunification won. “Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of the main winning 
party, was elected as Prime Minister of the Turkish Cypriots. Thus for the first time since 
1974, Rauf Denktash had lost his grip on the Turkish Cypriots”45 UN took of advantage of 
this chance and also encouraged Turkish Prime Minster to take a positive attitude for the 
resumption of negotiation before the EU accession due in May of 2004. Kofi Annan reopened 
the negotiation with Dentaş and Papadopulos in New York in February 2004, and succeded in 
the conclusion of agrrement about the pricipal of three-stage procedure. 
 
1) They would first negotiate between themselves in Cyprus on the basis of Annan III.  
2) Greece and Turkey would lend their collaboration 
3) If they were unable to agree on a text, Annan would have power to finalize his plan. 
The finalized plan would be submitted to seperate and simultaneous referenda. “46 
 
However, they negotiated could not draw the agreement. Kofi Annan began to show his 
intention that he would finalize the Annan Plan. On 25 March, “the UN communicated to the 
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two sides the main ideas for the final version and asked for reactions and two sides submitted 
their demands. And then, Kofi Annan put forward, in the morning of 30 March, a version of 
how he intended to finalize the plan, that is, Annan IV.”47 Annan IV contained a number of 
modifications inspired by Turkish Cypriot concerns, Annan IV gave the Greek Cypriots 
dissatisfaction. Kofi Annan asked both sides to comment on Annan IV, but there is no time to 
negotiate again and revised any contents. I will explain the specific content of the Annan Plan 
IV through Annan V, because there is hardly difference between two versions. Finally, Kofi 
Annan finalized the plan, Annan V on 31 March.  
 
3.6 Annan Plan V 
Finally, the Annan Plan was finalized by Kofi Annan, not by the Cypriots. The main issue 
changed from Annan III was: 
“• A common Cypriot federal state, the “United Cyprus Republic” with a rather weak 
central government and rather strong constituent states 
  Thus, the two-state solution that Denktash had fought for and that the Greek Cypriots 
had fiercely opposed, was rejected. On the other hand, the self determination of the 
communities on a wide scale was provided for as especially the Turkish Cypriot had 
wished. 
 
• Power-sharing arrangements in the federal state executive and legislative secured the 
political influence of the Turkish Cypriots above their numerical number of 18 percent 
of the population through a weighted system of votes in the government and in the two 
chambers of the federal parliament. 
 
• Return of about one-fifth of the land currently under Turkish Cypriot administration to 
the future Greek Cypriot State. (By this provision, about 100 000 Greek Cypriot refugees 
could return to their former homes and property under Greek Cypriot administration. 50 
000 Turkish Cypriot though, the current inhabitants of areas to be exchanged, would 
have to be resettled to another place in the Turkish Cypriot State.) 
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• Return of part of the property or/and a compensation for Greek Cypriots’ property 
remaining in the area of the new Turkish Cypriot State and Turkish Cypriots’ property in 
the area of the Greek Cypriot State. 
 
• Radical demilitarization of Cyprus. Abolition of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
forces and a phased reduction of Turkish troops from the island from currently 20000 – 
35000 to a maximum of 650 soldiers. 
 
• In international relations, it keeps the guarantor powers’ status of Greece, Turkey and 
Great Britain as provided in the provisions of the Zurich and London treaties that 
established the Republic of Cyprus in 1959/60. 
 
• The Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot forces including the reserve units are to be 
dissolved within three years.  
  
• The Turkish and Greek troops currently stationed on the island are to be radically 
reduced in stages.” 48 
 
The modification of the Annan plan IV which contained many benefits for Turkish Cypriots, 
disappointed Greek Cypriots. Additionally, the deadline for referendum which deprived the 
opportunity of more modification, led to the rejection by Greek Cypriots.  
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3.7 Result of Referenda 
A referendum on the Annan Plan V was held in North and South Cyprus on 24 April 2004. 
The two communities were asked whether they approved of the fifth revision of the United 
Nations proposal for reuniting the island. The question put to the electorate of the two 
communities was as follows: 
“Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the 
constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the 
laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the 
European Union united?”  —Annex IX, Article 1.1 
“The Greek Cypriots voted 24.2% in favor of the Annan Plan, and 75.8% against it, with a 
voter turnout of 88% of the eligible voters, whilst the Turkish Cypriots voted 64.9% in favor, 
35.1% against with an eligible voter turnout of 87%.”49 
 
 
Consequently, South Cyprus rejected the Annan Plan and the implementation of reunification 
plan was ruined. The negotiation of about 4 years vanished like a dream. It has disappeared as 
it itself prescribed in the Annex IX. It says: 
 
“Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved at the separate 
simultaneous referenda, or any guarantor fail to sign the Treaty on matters 
related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus by 29 April 2004, it shall be null 
and void, and have no legal effect.”50  
                                           
49 BBC News, “Referendum Result”, April 25th 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3656753.stm [accessed 
26/04/04] 
50 UN, the Security Council, “Annan Plan V. the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”, Annex IX. Article 1.2, 
31 March 2004  
 ３１ 
3.8 The Explanation of Papadopoulos for the Referendum 
On 4
th
 June, after the referendum, the President, Papadopoulos sent a letter to UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan. In the letter, it is clear why he could not have accepted the Annan plan 
V. In summary, it read:  
“The question of Turkish mainland settlers 
 
The permanent stationing of Turkish military forces in Cyprus, even after Turkey’s 
eventual accession to the European Union. GCs did not want this later reduction in 
exchange for permanent stationing of 650 Turkish troops (in effect a bridgehead). 
 
The expansion of the guarantor powers’ rights emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, 
through the inclusion of an additional protocol.  
 
The lack of sufficient time and the tight deadlines provided.  
These factors did not allow either substantial negotiations to take place, or for an agreed 
solution to be reached between the two communities. 
 
Turkey was granted rights to intervene in strategic economic benefits(Continental Shelf, 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
The management of Cyprus air space subject to Turkey’s consent. It would have also 
allowed Turkey to take all necessary actions (even military action) in the event of any 
threat to aircraft passengers, airport or aviation facilities. ” 51 
According to his opinion, from the very first day of the Foundation Agreement coming into 
operation, the Annan Plan was unfair in giving only Turkish Cypriots benefits, 
governmentally, politically, internationally, economically, security-wise, etc. In contrast, the 
two benefits for Greek Cypriots, namely territorial adjustments and reductions in the size of 
the Turkish Army in Cyprus, would not begin immediately, and would have taken a number 
of years to be phased in.  
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Chapter 4: Scrutinizing the Reasons of Rejection 
In order to find a desirable way for a gradual consensual reunification, it should be clear the 
reasons why Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan. As we can know from the letter of 
Papadopoulos, there is significant distance and polarization between the two communities. 
The two Cypriots conflicted in the questions of governance, property, residence, ‘settlers’ and 
security.  
 
“On governance, there is divergence on issues related to veto rights in the decision-
making process. On property, there is divergence regarding whether a solution 
should primarily take the form of restitution or compensation. On new Turkish 
settlers, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have contradictory views on the repatriation 
of Turkish immigrants. On security, we found some polarization, especially in 
matters related to the prospect of demilitarization. On residence rights, there are 
clear differences in the interpretation of bi-zonality, with Greek Cypriots strongly 
opposing and Turkish Cypriots preferring that members of each community should 
live primarily within the boundaries of their own constituent state.”52 
 
These disagreements are exposed well in the reasons for rejection of the Annan Plan 
Referendum. In addition to these reasons, the Annan Plan had several procedural problems 
such as the absence of will for reunification, deadline of negotiation, the lack of 
communication with the people, and interference of foreign negotiators. There were not only 
procedural problems, but also the unique situation of divided countries influenced to the 
referendum result. For these reasons, in this Chapter, it should be clear what made the Greek 
Cypriots vote ‘No’, and whether there is a possible solution or not, and what Korea should 
learn from these reasons of rejection.  
                                           
52 Erol Kaymak, Alexandros Lordos and Nathalie Tocci, “Building Confidence in Peace Public Opinion and the Cyprus” 
Peace Process, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008, p.37 
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4.1 Rejection due to Procedural Problems 
The Annan Plan had caused the opposition not only due to the content dissatisfaction but also 
because of procedural complaints. Firstly, it had a deadline, especially an ultimatum for the 
acceptance of Annan’s plan relating to EU accession. This deadline could not be the desirable 
measure for the Cyprus Reunification, because the deadline obstructs enough the negotiation 
for the Gradual Consensual Reunification. Secondly, the Annan Plan was put to referendum 
without enough communication with the people. The negotiation was conducted by leaders in 
secret and the last version, the Annan Plan V did not give Cypriots enough time to understand. 
Thirdly, the negotiation had been influenced by a third party, not Cypriots. Lastly, it should 
be rethought whether the referendum was a desirable method to accomplish the unification.  
 
 
4.1.1 Rejection of the Unification in Itself  
Every society member can have different opinion. It is no exception with reunifications. With 
this in mind, it should be considered whether most Cypriots were eager for reunification. 
Back to the time of Cyprus independence in the 1960’s, it is hard to say with confidence that 
Cypriots had kept the eagerness for independence and a unified country. In most of the 
conflicts with Turkish Cypriots, the term of “Enosis”53 was the ignition of tragedy. Even 
after the independence, both ethnic groups were attached to their ‘Mother Lands’. It cannot 
be denied that present division also came from their lack of eagerness for independence and 
integration. In the case of Cyprus, the independence of Cyprus was given by external powers 
and there was no time to develop a Cypriot identity. “There were Greek and Turkish people, 
other than Cypriots, who historically identified themselves with motherland nations. Hence, 
the very foundation of the Cypriot state was fragile, in fact, hollow.”54 
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 ３４ 
This historical background creates a critical and obvious difference in the support of 
reunification. One poll conducted in May 2004 showed that about one-third of Greek 
Cypriots were against reunification. According to this poll, “28.2 percent prefer the division 
of the island, either in its present form or by establishing two separate internationally 
recognized states. Permanent division has even more supporters among the younger age 
groups (18-24 and 25-34 year olds) with 41 and 35.4 percent respectively.”55 
Although, many Greek Cypriots opposed reunification, it is not also true that Cyprus 
does not have a sufficient will to accomplish re-unification. One interesting aspect of the 
Cyprus political systems make us rethink the Greek Cypriots’ will for reunification. “The 
House of Representatives consists of 80 seats. 56 of these members are elected by the Greek 
Cypriot Community by proportional representation and the 24 seats are allocated to the 
Turkish community but remain empty.”56 However, it is only proper that reunification can 
never be accomplished without the strong will of people. In order to have this strong will, it is 
important that they know why they want to accomplish reunification. If they want unilateral 
benefits from reunification, it is not unification but rather occupation. As the Absorptive 
reunification cannot be the desirable model of reunification, only when most of the 
population of each side wishes for a reunification be peaceful coexistence and mutual 
prosperity, can the unification come true.  
 
 
4.1.2 The February 2004, New York, Deadline Agreement 
In New York on 13 February 2004, the Annan Plan set the deadline. Although, in order to 
encourage negotiation parties to have good faith, deadline might be a desirable way, but the 
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deadline did not come from reunification issues, from EU accession. “The parties (including 
Greece and Turkey) then convinced the Secretary General that they possessed the necessary 
political will to reach an agreement on the basis of the Annan Plan before the crucial date of 
Cyprus’ EU accession (1 of May 2004)”57 “If they were unable to agree on a text, Annan 
would have the power to finalized plan would be submitted to separate and simultaneous 
referenda in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community.”58 Although it looks an 
epoch-making agreement, it was a trap that forced the Annan Plan to fail in the end. If the 
solution of unification be forcibly put to the referendum by the 3
rd
 party, it means that the 
incomplete Annan Plan could also be put to the referendum. In other words, the incomplete 
Annan Plan that could not help but be rejected due to the dissatisfaction of one side, could 
also be put to the referendum, because of the deadline. Even if Cypriots needed more time to 
negotiate and understand one other, compulsory arbitration made the Cypriots conclude their 
negotiation. President Christofias
59
 expressed well these procedural problems of Annan Plan. 
“Cypriots would negotiate a ‘Cypriot solution’ meaning a solution agreed without the 
interference and pressure of outside parties, and without timelines.”60 
 
4.1.3 Lack of Communication with People 
Another procedural problem of the Annan Plan was the exclusion of people in the process of 
negotiation. In reality, people did not have a chance to understand the Annan Plan fully. “Kofi 
Annan and Tom Weston (US Special Coordinator on Cyprus) do not want to give time for an 
in-depth discussion of the plan, when it is completed, because they know that it will expose 
its many problems.”61 In the end, Cypriots were forced to go to the referendum by foreign 
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negotiators without examining and knowing the Annan Plan. The attitude of Cypriot political 
leaders was not different from the UN’s. They controlled the information and public opinion 
to lead it in order to their intention. Hoffmeister explain about the situation as follows: 
“Already during the negotiations on the island, prominent Greek Cypriots 
including the Presidential Advisor Tzionis were given every opportunity to attack 
the plan whereas neither the United Nations nor the European Commission could 
actively participate in the public debate held in the electronic media. The board of 
the state-owned community from its TV shows.” 62  
 
One of the important lessons drawn from the rejection of the Annan Plan is the lack of public 
opinion in the process of negotiation. The Annan Plan was driven by leaders without 
transparent process. “Once the Plan was disclosed and because its content and philosophy had 
not been discussed in public over time, it became far easier for the ‘No’ camp in the south – 
where the Annan Plan process did not overlap with a period of effective regime change, as in 
the north – to make its case.”63 It is clear that the reunification problem should have been 
discussed and debated as many times as possible. “While not being a sufficient condition of 
success, an open and transparent process appears to have become a necessary element of a 
successful process in Cyprus.”64 Some scholars argue that the different result of referendum 
in the two Cypriot communities came from the attitude of government towards its nation’s 
people. One Turkish professor even says the following:  
 
“Most major Greek Cypriot parties, including the Unified Democratic Union of 
Cyprus (EDEK), the Democratic Party (DEKO), and the Democratic Rally 
(DESY), have so far stressed Greek nationalism and Greek identity, while also 
opposing the division of the island that confers autonomy on an envisaged 
Turkish Cypriot state in the north. On the Turkish side, Denktaş administration, 
who had monopolized political power for over thirty years, similarly emphasized 
frequently the right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots.”65 
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This opinion seems to side with the Turkish side, but there is an important point. 
Although communication with the people is also important, the possibility that political 
leader can manipulate the people for their political profits. In this situation, the people should 
keep watch on them and exercise their rights as a host of the country. The demonstration of 
the TRNC also shows obviously how much important the people’s role is for reunification. 
When Denktaş refused the Annan Plan II, “the inner Turkish Cypriot opposition to the 
Denktaş had occurred in large demonstration with platform ‘this country is ours’, and people 
demonstrated for an acceptance of the Annan plan and EU.” 66 Referendum is the method 
which asks the opinion of the people. Leaders of both sides should have opened the way to 
talks with the people, but they did not. In conclusion, before referendum in both sides, the 
people should have had many opportunities of the nation to discuss and revise during the 
process of negotiation. It was the biggest reason of failure of the Annan Plan to disclose the 
process of negotiation.  
 
4.1.4 Interference of Foreign Powers  
To make matters worse, Cyprus negotiation were interfered by foreign powers so that the 
Cypriots could not operate their negotiation. Also, the UN did not have enough power to 
control the interested states. “Annan made a strategic mistake, as a third-party, by forming 
the plan by himself and his foreign consultants, without consulting, or consulting adequately, 
with the Cypriot leaders and communities.” 67 The 3rd parties are not concerned how the plan 
is good for Cypriots, just as Turkey was only interested in their accession into the EU. 
Although Kofi Annan endeavored to solve Cyprus problem, he could not do anything without 
the consent of super powers. 
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When a country faces internal conflict, there can be two ways to solve the problem. The 
conflicting parts can reach agreement themselves, or a third party, that is, an external power 
can intervene as an arbitrator. Through the case of Cyprus’ independence of 1960, it is clear 
that the negotiation conducted by an external power cannot be retained for long time. 
 
“The 1959 and 1960 Zurich-London Agreements was concluded by external 
powers, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. That solution did not last because both 
Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks basically viewed the Zurich-London agreements 
as the denial of their national aspirations, enosis and taksim, respectively. Thus, the 
best solution will be the one found directly only by the parties themselves. Yet the 
major difficulty affecting policy making for years has been each side’s conviction 
that the other side has irredentist ambitions. The mutual fear of becoming victim 
again, being attacked one more time by the other side, perpetuates a hostile vigilance 
and an unwillingness to take risk.” 68 
 
Not following the will of the Cypriots, the solution founded by external powers cannot help 
but fail. The Annan Plan V is the same case. The two Cypriot sides should have negotiated 
directly until both sides arrived at a reasonable solution. The interference of external powers 
can never be a solution.  
 
4.1.5 Problems Arising from the Substance of Referenda  
Although Monarchy disappeared and democracy is being considered as a panacea, democracy 
is not the only solution. If the process of negotiation does not communicate with the people in 
full, the referendum cannot be a good solution to decide the fate of a country. Democratic, 
majority rule should have been applied in the process of negotiation, but Cypriot leaders did 
not try to incorporate public opinion into the Annan Plan. Before they asked the consent of 
the people for the Annan Plan, they should have gotten their consent on each issue in the 
process of negotiation. If they could not get the consent of the people, they should have 
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explained and consulted the people. In the end, the Annan Plan was abandoned by majority 
rule as the majority of people did not know the Annan Plan.  
Moreover, the Yes or No vote questionnaire of Cyprus Referendum was not a reasonable 
way to confirm the people’s opinion. They should have organized the vote items in enough 
detail to know which aspects suggested in the Annan Plan could not be accepted by people. In 
other words, the items up for vote should have been organized in a way that made clear what 
the people accepted and what the people rejected. 
 
 
Annan V, Annex IX, Article 1.1 
This type of survey question is precisely the type which should be avoided. Above all, 
the question of referendum includes several items in one questionnaire that should have been 
separate. Issues such as governmental system, Demilitarization and private property, could 
have been put as separate items. Even if only one issue was accepted, Cyprus could have 
approached real reconciliation one more step with this one admission.  
 ４０ 
4.2 Rejection due to Political System 
4.2.1 Political System in the Annan Plan 
Before seeing the political system of the Annan Plan, it needs to understand the concepts of 
federation, confederation and unitary states. The federation and confederation systems of 
state have been insisted on by divided countries. ‘Federation’ means “a group of states with a 
central government but independence in internal affairs.”69 In other words, Federation is a 
type of polity united with more than two states and having a central government. Professor, 
Watts (1998) defines a federation as “a compound polity combining constituent units and a 
general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a 
constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant 
portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its 
citizens”70 
On the other hand, Confederation is “a more or less permanent union of states with 
some or most political power vested in a central authority” 71  Watts also defines 
confederations as “a species of federal system in which the institutions of shared rule are 
dependent on the constituent governments, being composed of delegates from the constituent 
governments and therefore having only an indirect electoral and fiscal base.”72 To sum up, 
the difference of each political system is as in the following table. 
 
Unitary Confederation Federal 
Central government has all 
the power to make laws and 
decision for the people 
Individual states make their 
own laws and decision and 
are loosely aligned to a weak 
central government 
Power to make laws and 
decision for the people is 
shared between central 
government and States 
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Although the Annan Plan used the term of ‘Federation’ in its text, the political system that the 
Annan Plan suggested was close to a confederate system, because “there was no hierarchy of 
laws, while central authority emanated from the so-called component states. The Supreme 
Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot (77% of population) and Turkish Cypriot 
judges (18% of population), plus three foreign judges.”73 “United Cyprus Republic in a bi-
zonal federal structure comprised of two constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the 
Turkish Cypriot State.”74 
 
 
                                                             
75 
 
In conclusion, the Annan Plan proposed a confederate political system, but Greek Cypriots 
rejected it. 
 
4.2.2 Each Cypriot Position for Political System 
Generally, Classical arguments in favor of a unitary state assert that a unitary state “enhances 
national unity and consensus, promotes security, protects citizens against encroachment by 
the state, limits ethnic conflict, and safeguards individual and communal liberty.”76  
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However, it is also right to say that “majorities tend to favor the option of federations, 
while minorities tend to prefer confederations.” 77  Like this, while the Greek-Cypriot 
community is in favor of a unitary state, the Turkish-Cypriot community favors a looser 
confederation. That is to say, the Greek side “has preferred either a unitary state or a strong 
federation with regard to the issue of the future political system. On the other hand, the 
Turkish side has until recently preferred either a confederation or two independent states as a 
solution to the future political system of the island.”78 The Greek Cypriots being the majority, 
prefer to maintain their vested rights, because the unitary state is proper to maintain the 
vested rights of majority group with the majority rule. Moreover, “the Greek-Cypriot 
community rejects the option of a confederation because they believe it would allow the 
TRNC to become a sovereign state.”79  
After all, Greek Cypriots prefer to maintain their superiority in number, while Turkish 
Cypriots prefer to maintain minimum self-government to protect themselves from Greek 
Cypriots. In this situation, the third-party cannot help taking a middle position would which 
can protect the weaker minority party between unitary and confederate system. “Almost all 
the third-party elites try to promote a federal solution to the Cyprus conflict.”80 
 
4.2.3 Reconsideration of the Importance of Political System and Gradual 
Political Integration 
 
A federation and a confederation is just one step for accomplishing a unitary nation. As I 
have said repeatedly, a gradual, consensual reunification is the desirable model of 
reunification. The type of political system cannot be made absolutely in the first stage of 
reunification. For example, federations have had many failures in its application. Maurice 
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Vile who supported Lijphart’s analysis of the conditions conducive to consociational 
democracy, asserted: 
 
“Whether federal structures provide an adequate solution depends on the existence 
of several factors, similar to those conducive to consociationalism. However, 
echoing Lijphart’s analysis of the conditions conducive to consociational 
democracy, Maurice Vile asserts that no two-unit federation has ever survived. ‘the 
danger of an irreconcilable confrontation between the units in a two unit federation 
is so great that sooner or later it would lead to a civil war, secession, or both.”81 
It should not be assumed that confederation was not also had the same problems. “Note that 
the United States abandoned its original con-federal structure because it was unworkable. In 
1789, a federate constitution was established containing a clear federal supremacy clause.”82 
The political system can be changed any time by the people.   
It can be a solution to apply adequately the degree of separation and integration in the 
stage of reunification. In other words, Gradual Consensual reunification can be accomplished 
by gradual political integration. “Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for 
further combat.”83 Separation is one solution for Cyprus in order to avoid internal conflicts. 
In the first step of reunification, a separated political system could be more desirable. 
However, understanding that separation can prevent the profits of reunification and because 
separation can cause a tragedy as severe as the Korean War, the 2 states, with the consent of 
the people, can accept a more integrated system. “That partition quite possibly not only fails 
to address the issues, but moreover results in conflict on a different level.”84 In order to 
maintain the integrity of the political system, the change to both political systems must be 
gradual. No country in the world which has an absolute political system. This argument 
becomes more reasonable because of the fact that Cypriots does not have an identity as the 
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people of a unitary nation. There are three reasons a Cypriot identity failed to develop: 
 
“. First, Greek and Turkish Cypriots differ from one another along lines with ethnic 
origin, religion, and language. Second, the political system during Ottoman rule also 
encouraged ethnic separation. Under the millet system, the Greek and Turkish 
communities were institutionalized as distinct cemaats (communities), exercising 
separate rights, electing their own judicial and administrative officials. Third, as an 
extension of the millet system, each community set up its own system of education 
conducted in its own language. In sum, throughout the colonial rule, it was hardly 
possible to talk about a distinct Cypriot identity. Few, if any, Cypriots felt and 
considered themselves as Cypriots.”85 
 
The two Cypriot nations had lived as the people of a unitary nation almost for 4 centuries. 
Although they had had opposing points, it was enough time for reconciliation. However, they 
have different national identities. Therefore, in the first step of reunification, a unitary or 
federation type of political system is not desirable. Cyprus would do better to develop its 
identification as the same people through gradual political integration.  
In conclusion, the UN’s solution, Annan V, can be a desirable solution in the first step of 
reunification. “The plan internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus and replaced it by a 
loose confederation of two largely autonomous states. This new state would be known as the 
‘United Republic of Cyprus’, with a new flag and anthem.”86 Going to a Federation and 
Unitary system is the mission that Cypriots should accomplish gradually with confidence and 
cooperation , not implemented immediately as mandated by a 3th party.  
 
4.2.4 Recognition of the TRNC 
One of big barriers in the negotiation towards political integration was the recognition of the 
TRNC. Turkish Cypriots require an equal status as a negotiator with South Cyprus. Greek 
Cypriots live in the state which is recognized by UN as the sole sovereignty. This is a very 
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strong vested right for Greek Cypriots. This way of thinking was shown clearly in the 
televised speech of the Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos on 7 April 2004.  
 
“When he asked his community to say a resounding ‘NO’ to the Annan Plan in 
the referendum: ‘Taking up my duties, I was given an internationally recognized 
state. I am not going to give back a Community without a say internationally 
and in search of a guardian. I urge you to defend the Republic of Cyprus, saying 
‘NO’ to its abolition.’ Furthermore, just two days before the referenda 
Papadopoulos claimed that if the Annan Plan is not collapsed, there would be no 
Republic of Cyprus but just a Greek Cypriot constituent state.”87 
 
Papadopoulos’ desire to keep his vested status is apparent in this speech. This leader of 
Greek Cypriots did not want to share sovereignty, and wanted to put Turkish Cypriots under 
his power with giving some part of political power. The model of unification insisted on by 
Papadopoulos was Absorptive Unification. As I have explained above, the absorptive 
unification model by negotiation can only be accomplished when the superior part has far 
stronger economic, military and political power and only when each part has a strong will to 
reconcile and unite. However, Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot be integrated together 
easily because they have different language and religion. After all, “Papadopoulos eager to 
‘protect’ the internationally accepted Cyprus state, and Denktash wanted to ‘protect’ his 
unrecognized and internationally shunned state.”88 The two Cypriots have drawn a parallel 
line that is unable to meet.  
    In conclusion, gradual, consensual reunification in equal status is the desirable model of 
reunification which can accomplish the purpose of unification. The equal status is not sharing 
power by numbers, but namely by having equal voice in the negotiation stage. If South 
Cyprus sincerely wishes to achieve reunification, the quickest way is through recognition of 
the TRNC as an equal companion.  
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4.3 Rejection of Stationing of Foreign Forces 
4.3.1 Proposal of the Annan Plan for Foreign Forces  
The security aspect of the Annan Plan can be summarized by two important issues. One is the 
demilitarizing of Cyprus by disbandment and withdrawal, the other is the guarantee of 
intervention rights of foreign power. The demilitarizing plan in Annan V is follows: “ 
 
1) The Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot forces including the reserve units are to 
be dissolved within three years. Currently, the Turkish Cypriot forces consist of 
5000 military personnel in active and 26 000 in reserve units. The Greek Cypriot 
forces consist of 10 000 soldiers in active and 60 000 in reserve units 
 
2) The Turkish troops currently stationed on the island –20000 to 35000 – are to be 
radically reduced in stages: 
- to a maximum of 6000 within 3 years / a maximum of 3000 within 7 years, 
- to a maximum of 650 soldiers within 14 years time or the date of EU accession of 
Turkey, whichever is sooner. 
 
3) Greece, which currently has a contingent of 1250 soldiers in Cyprus, would have the 
right to station a similar amount of troops on the island as Turkey with one 
difference: The final strength of its force could consist of 950 soldiers compared to 
the allowed maximum of 650 Turkish soldiers.  
 
4) The latter provision and the latter troop level are provisions of the Treaty of 
Alliance, one of the Treaties with which the Republic of Cyprus was established. 
 
5) In 2010 and thereafter every three years Cyprus, Greece and Turkey should review 
the troop levels of the remaining Greek and Turkish forces with the objective of their 
total withdrawal. 
 
6) The UN is to increase its forces, currently about 850, to several thousand to maintain 
‘a secure environment’ and to ‘monitor the implementation’ of the agreement”89 
 
Consequently, Cypriots military forces will be dissolved fully in the end, Turkish and 
Greek forces will be decreased by gradual withdrawal. On the other hand, the international 
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organization forces, and US peace keeping forces will increase. There is, however, no 
mention of a sovereign, British military base. If the security issue in Annan Plan can be 
summarized by a table: 
 
The point we should take notice of is that the UN gave the two Cypriot nations open 
opportunities to negotiate their security issue by themselves, but deprived their sovereignty 
through guaranteeing the intervention of foreign power . According to the Article 3: 
 
Article 3 
1. The Greek and Turkish contingents shall be permitted to be stationed under the Treaty 
of Alliance in the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State respectively.  
2. (Ellipsis) 
3. Thereafter, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall review troop levels every five years with 
the objective of total withdrawal. [This will in no way undermine the provisions of the 
Treaty of Alliance and its Additional Protocols, and the rights and responsibilities 
conferred thereby.] 
 90 
Finally, “the rights of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey remained in principle untouched, 
including the provision of the ‘Treaty of Guarantee’ that gives them the “right to take action 
with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs”91 
The withdrawal of foreign forces was not a critical problem at the time of referendum, 
but the assurance of sovereignty to decide their own security issues was. Either the UN did 
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not have enough power to implement the solution it willed or it did not have sufficient will to 
solve the Cyprus problem. The UN was also struggling in regards to foreign interests. One 
evidences of this fact is that the Annan Plan did not change any provisions of the treaties of 
1959/60 concerning the British military bases in Cyprus. “Currently, there are 3,275 military 
personnel in the British Sovereign Bases. Although these bases are seen as an anachronistic 
relict of the colonial past, nobody wanted to touch this issue in the UN-sponsored talks.”92 
 
4.3.2 Two Cypriots’ Positions for the Stationing of Foreign Forces 
Among the purposes of reunification, the very important is security; the end of military 
conflict. However, military conflict does not mean only their own military conflict, but rather 
the stationing of foreign military forces makes its own, more serious problems for Cyprus and 
Korea. Turkish military forces in the TRNC and USA military forces in South Korea have 
become the biggest obstruction for reunification negotiations. The TRNC does not want the 
withdrawal of Turkish forces without a guarantee of their security, because Turkish Cypriots 
cannot be convinced that the Greek Cypriots will not act aggressively by relying on their 
numbers.  According to a poll conducted in 2008, while 66% of Greek Cyprus agrees the 
full withdrawal of foreign forces, 75% of Turkish Cypriots oppose it. 
 
Cypriots Opinion for the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces 
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From time to time, foreign forces are necessary for protection. However, foreign forces 
are not stationed only for world peace. They receive compensation for being stationed, and it 
is also beneficial for their own, strategic benefit. Therefore, it is obvious that foreign forces 
must be withdrawn when it is no longer necessary. For foreign forces’ withdrawal, the only 
remaining problem is how long time it will take. The Annan Plan suggested a solution for this 
step and a time frame for withdrawal.  
For the Annan Plan, the Greek side suggested some amendments, not just refusal. “One 
suggestion has been to introduce a term limit of some sort on the Treaty. For example, the 
treaty could be amended to expire when Turkey joins the European Union. This idea of a 
‘sunset clause’ has in fact received widespread attention and is seen by many to be a rather 
obvious and logical approach to the issue.”94 Nevertheless, this suggestion is limited to only 
when the card of EU accession is valuable for Turkey, because this suggestion does not solve 
the problem of mistrust. Turkish accession into the EU does not necessarily accomplish the 
full withdrawal of Turkish forces that the Greek Cypriots wish. Turkish “senior military 
commanders have noted that if Turkey were to join the European Union the issue of Cyprus, 
and the Aegean, could be solved very quickly – even though he insisted that Turkish troops 
must remain in Cyprus.”95 
 “Another idea has also been put forward. For example, it has been suggested by Greek 
Cypriots that any attempt to impose a demand that a right of intervention must be confirmed 
by the UN Security Council.”96 This can be one solution for preventing the guarantee of 
power. However, in reality, external powers which compose to international society are more 
selfish. If Turkey accepts this suggestion, Turkey should give up all of its right to Cyprus. At 
first glance, this looks fair but this suggestion cannot be accepted by Turkey in the first step 
of reunification.  
                                           
94 James Ker-Lindsay, “the Security Dimensions of a Cyprus Solution”, the Hellenic Observatory Paper, The European 
Institue, 2008, p.11 Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22027/1/GreeSE_No19.pdf 
95 Ibid, p.12 
96 Ibid, p.12 
 ５０ 
Now, it should be solved the problem how to expel the foreign forces and what the 
solution for the problem of withdrawal of Turkish forces is. Surprisingly, Korea also has a 
serious disagreement for the stationing of foreign forces, namely USA military. It is 
worthwhile to compare these two cases regarding foreign forces.  
 
4.3.3 How the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces Can Be Accomplished 
Papadopoulos was very anxious about 650 Turkish soldiers remaining after 2018.  
 
“The 650 Turkish soldiers that are allowed to remain in Cyprus according to the 
Annan plan until Greece, Turkey and Cyprus agree otherwise are seen by 
President Papadopoulos as a bridgehead for a possible military invasion by 
Turkey. 650 Turkish soldiers are frequently mentioned as a ‘bridgehead’ for 
Turkish invasion. The avowed purpose was to avoid the demilitarization 
provisions and to keep members of the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces in 
action.”97 
 
However, Turkish military intervention is deemed impossible without the internal armed 
conflict. Turkey cannot ignore the international society and super powers. The existence of 
650 Turkish forces is hardly important. Turkish Cypriots can be far more threatened by Greek 
forces remaining in Cyprus than Greek Cypriots of Turkish military. Moreover, Greek 
Cypriots lost their chance to decrease the number of Turkish forces, because they had begun 
to worry about the problem only after 14 years. In reality, Greek Cypriots are threatening 
over 30,000 Turkish soldiers now, because of their rejection of the Annan Plan. It was 
revealed, just one year after the referendum, that Greek Cypriots mistakenly selected this 
subject as a reason for mistrust and anxiety. For example, Sokrates Hasikos, the vice 
president of the main opposition party DISY and former Minister of Defense, put it “after the 
EU accession of Cyprus and after Mr. Erdogan became Prime Minister of Turkey, there is no 
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threat of a Turkish attack. Because Turkey is orientated towards an EU accession, a crisis 
would not be in its interest”98 Moreover, if they really feared the stationing of Turkish forces, 
it was incomprehensible that “the Greek Cypriot defense budget has been reduced quite 
significantly over the past years due to fiscal considerations, from US $429 million in 2000, 
to US $260 million in 2002, and US $148 million in 2004.”99 Now, I would like to remind 
that the target of mistrust was selected wrongly. Mistrust should not be aimed at Cypriot 
opposition but rather the emphasis should be the expulsion of foreign powers. Therefore, the 
argument that the right to unilateral intervention by the guarantor powers Britain, Turkey and 
Greece must be abolished, is more urgent for Cyprus than a full Turkish withdrawal. The 
guarantee of right of intervention by foreign power is same as losing sovereignty and being 
colonized. 
Eventually, the solution of the security problem is a balance of external power and 
diplomacy. Korean sovereignty was deprived by Japan because of failure of balance of 
external power and diplomacy in WWI. Cyprus also a failed to keep balance between Greece 
and Turkey, and Cyprus was divided. A step by step approach is the only solution for a 
peaceful method of negotiation. In this regard, even though the UN is controlled by world 
super powers, the Annan Plan was one of the best methods. No side can require expect full 
and immediate compensation for past loss and full satisfaction from current negotiations. 
Both parties should give up their obstinacy and approach things step by step. Until 
accomplishing absolute integrity and self-reliance of national defense, Korea and Cyprus 
must cooperate to expel external powers gradually so that they can avoid the suspicion of. A 
mutual trust can also be established in this process. Not making impossible demands and 
leaving a room to negotiate, while appeasing external powers, is desirable for the solution for 
security issues.  
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4.4 Rejection of New Turkish Settlers, Citizenship Issue 
4.4.1 Annan Plan’s Proposal for Turkish Settlers 
The Annan Plan suggested the solution for new Turkish Settler which invested the autonomy 
of the two Cypriots communities. According to the Annan Plan,  
 
“In the Annan plan (art. 3), there is reference to ‘a single Cypriot citizenship’ 
regulated under federal law as well as the ‘internal constituent state 
citizenship status’ to be enjoyed by ‘all Cypriot citizens’; moreover, the plan 
lays out a set of complicated rules about preserving the ‘identity’ (see 
appendix1). The acquisition of citizenship is regulated by an agreed 
constitutional law which essentially deals with the issue of settlers from 
Turkey. Moreover the plan envisages a federal law on ‘aliens and 
immigration’ (Foundation Agreement, Attachment 5, Law 1) as well as a 
federal law for international protection and the implementation of the 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 
on the Status of Refugees (Foundation Agreement, Attachment 5, Law 2) 
which, in the event of a settlement, would replace the current laws on 
immigration and refugees.”100 
 
Consequently, the Annan Plan V suggested “nearly all the Turkish settlers would be granted 
citizenship or residence rights leading to citizenship. The central government would have 
limited control towards future Turkish Immigration.”101 And many Greek Cypriots rejected 
this suggestion with their Time-determining nationalism, 1974. 
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4.4.2 Greek Cypriots’ Position for New Turkish Settlers 
Before scrutinizing the identity of Cypriots, the term of a nation should be clear. “Stalin has 
given a more concise definition: A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of 
language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of 
culture.”102 This definition cannot be applied to every country, because humanity has 
produced numerous concepts of national people by their circumstance. For example, there is 
Ethnic Nationalism which is defined in terms of ethnicity, Territorial Nationalism which 
assumes that all inhabitants of a particular nation owe allegiance to their country of birth or 
adoption, Cultural Nationalism which allow people to become members of a nation by 
cultural assimilation, Linguistic Nationalism which see "the nation" as all speakers of a 
specific language, and so on. 
Cyprus had just been part of another country before its independence in 1960, so they 
could not have an identity as the people of Cyprus. The term of Cypriot does not mean 
national identity, but is nearer to the concept of territorial residence. Even though the two 
Cypriot communities have different languages, and religions, but there are also ambiguous 
points which they cannot be easily distinguished. In the Turkish nationalism, there is no 
territorial, cultural, even ethnic factor in determining its people. The main factor of 
“Turkification”103 was language and religion. Greek people were also the nation of the 
Ottoman Empire and “some ethnic groups of Turkey”104. There is one flexible criterion 
                                           
102 Eric Hobsbawm,” Nations and Nationalism since 1780”, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.5 
103 A term used to describe a process of cultural or political change in which something or someone who is not a Turk 
becomes one, voluntarily or involuntarily. 
104 Turkish people categorized by Original language  
1) Turkic-speaking peoples Turkmen, Azeris, Tatars, Karachays, Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Crimean, 
Tatars, Yörüks and Uyghurs 
2) Indo-European-speaking peoples Kurds, Zazas, Bosniaks, Albanians, Pomaks, Macedonians, Armenians, 
Hamshenis and Greeks 
3) Semitic-speaking peoples : Arabs, Syriacs and Jews 
4) Caucasian-speaking peoples : Circassians, Georgians, Laz and Chechens 
Wikipedia, “Demographics of Turkey”, Source= Andrews, Peter A. “Ethnic groups in the Republic of Turkey”, Beiheft Nr. B 60, 
Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients, Wiesbaden: Reichert Publications, 1989, Available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Turkey#cite_note-18 
 ５４ 
contrary to above conventional criteria. According to the notion of Self-determining Nation, 
If Greek and Turkish people consider a person as a Cypriot, he or she is the people of Cyprus 
and can receive citizenship of Cyprus. This definition of Self-determining Nation can be 
applied to Cypriot identity. According to one research poll, 65% of Greek Cypriots refused to 
accept new Turkish settlers as the people of Cyprus.  
 
105
 
Greek Cypriots refused to accept Turkish Cypriots as citizen of Cyprus who immigrated 
after 1974. This included their descendents. The only possible exception was in the case of 
those who have married Turkish Cypriots and the children of such mixed marriages. 
According to this criterion, Turkish Cypriots who lived in Cyprus before 1974 can be 
accepted as a citizen of Cyprus, but Turkish Cypriots that immigrated after 1974 cannot be.  
“When Cyprus gained independence in 1960, a census was conducted by the new 
Republic’s bi-communal government. Census figures revealed a population of 573,566, of 
whom 442,138 (77.1%) were Greek Cypriots, and 104,320 (18.2%) were Turkish 
Cypriots.”106 “The South Cyprus’ estimates of the population of Turkish settlers in the north 
range from 130,000-160,000, while it also claims that the Turkish Cypriot population has 
decreased from 118,000 to 85,000 since 1974.”107 According to the TRNC census of 2006, 
                                           
105 Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci, supra note 52, p.38  
106 Mete Hatay, “the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?”, PRIO(Peace Research Istitute, Oslo) Report, 2007, p.21 
107 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “İllegal Demographic Changes”, Available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus06_en/cyprus06_en?OpenDocument 
 
 
 ５５ 
“the de facto population in north Cyprus has now reached 265,100.”108 “By 2011, the 
population of South Cyprus is 838,897.”109 the change of population is as follows: 
 
 North Cyprus South Cyprus 
1960 104,320 442,138 
Latest 265,100 (2006) 838,897 (2011) 
Claim for settlers 85,000 160,000 
  
The Greek Cypriots’ criteria of the people look as though it cannot be accepted by the 
Turkish side. Greek Cypriots have deemed that they want to maintain their numerically 
superiority in order to acquire benefits such as territory, and political power. The Greek 
Cypriots claim that the time criterion of 1974 cannot be accepted due to three reasons. Firstly, 
Greek Cypriots were not always the majority ethnic group. The majority group was changed 
by historical situations. Especially, from 1745 to 1821, before the Greek independence from 
Ottoman Empire, Turkish Cypriots were the majority or even in number with the Greek 
Cypriots.  
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I do not deny the importance of 1974, the time of division. However, reunification does not 
mean that both sides should go back to the past time before being divided. Reunification 
requires each side accept the present situation of the opposite side.  
Secondly, Greek Cypriots do not consider that they are violating the time criterion which 
they have claimed. By 2011, the population of South Cyprus is 838, 897, and “the increased 
proportion of foreign citizens which reached 21.4% of the total population contributed to the 
overall population growth. The corresponding figure in 2001 was 9.4%.”111 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION BY DISTRICT AND CITIZENSHIP, 2011  
 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN CITIZENS BY COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP, 2011 
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According to the time criterion of Greek Cypriots, South Cyprus should deprive foreigner 
citizens of their citizenship for Cyprus to be united. It cannot abandon 180,000 people. In this 
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regard, if Turkish settlers are granted North Cyprus citizenship already, it is natural that they 
should be accepted as a Cypriot. 
Thirdly, Greek Cypriots are also immigrated settlers, not aboriginal people. Greece 
never occupied this island with Greek sovereignty, while the Ottoman Empire occupied and 
declared this island officially as part of its territory. “The occupying forces of Cyprus can be 
listed as the Assyrians (707-650), Egyptians (570-546), Persians (546-333), Ptolemies (320s-58), 
Romans (58 BC-1489 AD), and Venetians (1489-1571). Cyprus was conquered by the 
Ottoman Turks in 1571.”113 And then, “In the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–
1878) was leased to the British Empire. Following the outbreak of World War I, the British 
Empire formally annexed Cyprus, on 5 November 1914.”114 There was no period in which 
Greek nationals acquired the sovereignty of Cyprus. “A major wave of Greek settlement is 
believed to have taken place following the Bronze Age collapse of Mycenaean Greece in the 
period 1100–1050 BCE, with the island's predominantly Greek character dating from this 
period.”115 Their only ground of possessory right for Cyprus is that they presently occupy it. 
In conclusion, it cannot be founded that Greek Cypriots cannot accept the Turkish new settler 
as a Cypriots.  
 
4.4.3 Reconstruction of a New Cypriot Identity 
The reason that Greek Cypriots are sensitive to accept new Turkish settlers as a Cyprus 
citizen, is that they do not want to lose their predominance in number. The number was the 
basis for deciding important issues such as sharing of political power and, territory range. 
This consciousness was reflected well in the letter of Papadopoulos. He answered the UN 
after referendum,  
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“What however we were not willing to accept, as you very well knew, was that each 
and every settler, indeed all, should be entitled to remain and ultimately acquire 
citizenship. Neither we were ready to endorse new provisions allowing new settlers 
flows in the future, thus altering further and distorting the demographic balance on 
the island.”116 
 
In fact, it is widely believed that one of the reasons the Greek-Cypriots voted ‘NO’ to the 
Annan plan was the fear of ‘large numbers’ of settlers who would eventually be allowed to 
remain. Relating to this issue, there is one critical point. That is the fact that Greek Cypriots 
rejected the con-federal system. With the unbalanced situation in the number of ethnic groups, 
it is the very desirable to integrate each community gradually. Cultural exchange, mixed 
marriage and integrated education are one way toward absolute integrity. However, Greek 
Cypriots prefer to share political power by their number in the first step of united Cyprus. 
Sharing political power and to discriminating against an ethnic group can never lead to real 
integrity.  
Now, I would like to suggest that Cypriots have to reconstruct their new identity, if they 
really want to live together prosperously and peacefully. Greek Cypriots do not have clear 
criterion as to who are Turkish people and who are Turkish Cypriots. This is true of Turkish 
thinking towards Greek and Greek Cypriots also. Therefore, if Cypriots wish for a peaceful 
and prosperous unification of Cyprus, both sides should reconstruct their national identity. 
Professor, A. Marco Turk suggested one way for Cypriot identity:  
 
“Notwithstanding the historical weakening of the Cypriot identity, ‘a unique 
Cypriot identity’ was claimed that should be the basis for mutual acceptance and 
respect. The Cypriot multicultural society was referred to in the hope that 
‘humanistic values’ rather than ‘national values’ would be developed Creation of 
cultural endeavors was encouraged in an effort to promote the unique Cypriot 
culture domestically and internationally.”117 
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Simultaneously, both Cypriots should endeavor to accomplish real national reconciliation. If 
needed, they could adopt English as an official language. Additionally, through guaranteeing 
absolute freedom of religion, the religion of Cyprus should be diversified, rather than the 
current bipolar system. Government and society should encourage mixed marriage. It is also 
a worthy idea to consider that government grants the new Cypriot citizenship through an 
administration of an oath like the USA. In order to pursue this movement, the leadership of 
political leaders is a critical factor. Fortunately, “some efforts to create a Cypriot identity 
have actually been made by the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) on the 
Greek side, their utility has remained rather marginal.”118 This endeavor of some people is 
not enough to construct new Cypriot identity. Cypriots should endeavor to build the law 
system which can accept a new Cypriot identity, especially in the Cyprus Nationality Act. 
According to Cyprus Nationality Act: 
 
“The current law provides that children born to parents, one of whom unlawfully 
entered or resides in the Republic, do not automatically become citizens of Cyprus 
even if the other parent holds or would have been entitled to Cypriot citizenship. 
They can become citizens only following a decision of the Council of Ministers. 
This amendment was apparently directed against Turkish nationals who settled in 
the north at a time when it was deemed politically ‘necessary’ or ‘expedient’ by 
policymakers.”119 
 
Not only the Nationality Act but, there is another subordinate law which regulates Cyprus 
citizenship. According to sect. 109(3) of law 141(I)/2002,  
 “This law expressly prescribes that the above provisions for acquisition of 
citizenship do not come into force in cases where a person is born in Cyprus or abroad 
between 16 August 1960 and 11 June 1999, if his or her claim is based solely on his or 
her mother’s citizenship, or the fact that she was entitled to citizenship of the 
Republic. However, the law stipulates that the person (or if the person is a minor, his 
or her father or mother) may submit an application to the minister to be registered as a 
citizen of Cyprus.”120 
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This discrimination is aimed to Turkish-Cypriots. There is only one way to overcome these 
obstructions. That is the aspiration for reunification. If Cypriots have the sincere aspiration 
for reunification, they should accept their neighboring ethnic community as family.  
 ６１ 
4.5 Rejection for Property Issues 
Unification is evaluated by the economic calculation of individuals, not by national sprit, 
patriotism or a far-sighted national policy. Cyprus is not an exception to this case. When 
Turkish military intervened in Cyprus, about “40% of the ethnic Greek-Cypriots 
population”121 became refugee and were displaced losing their property.   
     The compensation claim for this lost property is a very sensitive issue. The individual 
economic profits take first priority over any other national profits. Especially, this tendency 
reflects on the Cyprus referendum very well. “Not long after the Annan Plan failed at 
referendum, it became quite common to hear Cypriots say that the Cyprus Problem is really 
all about property.”122 Finally, the Annan Plan was rejected by Greek Cypriots, because most 
of Greek people urge that Turkey must compensate for all responsibility of its invasion of 
Cyprus and its murders, rapes, destruction of property and churches, looting. 
 
4.5.1 Annan Plan’s Proposal for Property Issues 
Annan proposed a very detailed solution for the property issues. First of all, Cyprus Property 
Board and its divisions (the Claims Bureau, the Cyprus Housing Bureau and the 
Compensation Bureau) would be established. Reinstatement can be different by whether the 
area is included in territorial adjustment or not. 
 
“[For Reinstatement in Territorial Adjustment Areas] 
(part of the territory presently not under the control of the Republic of Cyprus 
would become part of the ‘Greek Cypriot State’) In the areas that would be subject 
to this process of ‘territorial adjustment’ after the solution, properties of 
‘dispossessed owners’ (locally known as ‘refugees’) would be reinstated to their 
original owners.  
                                           
121 Roge Zetter, “the Greek Cypriot Refugees; Perceptions of Return under conditions of Protracted Exile”, The Center for 
Migration Studies of New York, Inc., International Migration Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 1994, p.308 
122 Hatay and Bryant, supra note 60, p.14 
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[Reinstatement Outside Territorial Adjustment Areas: The ‘One-Third Rule’] 
In areas that remain outside territorial adjustment, property rights related to affected 
properties would be exercised through either reinstatement or compensation. 
Dispossessed owners of properties located in the other constituent state would be 
given back their properties according to the so-called ‘one-third rule’. According to 
this rule, such persons would have the right to be returned up to one-third of their 
property (in value and land area), and to receive ‘full and effective compensation’ 
for the remaining two-thirds. 
[Exceptions to the One-Third Rule for Reinstatement] 
The right of reinstatement of one-third of the affected property would apply to 
natural persons or family businesses. Properties of institutions, including the 
Church and Evkaf, the main religious foundations of Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots, would not be reinstated and would be transferred to the Property Board in 
exchange for compensation.”123 
The Governing Council shall decide the reinstatement and the method of compensation by 
the present purpose of land use and situation. The Governing Council shall be composed of 
“a total of seven members, being two members hailing from each constituent state and three 
non-Cypriot members who are not citizens of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey or the United 
Kingdom.”124  
 
4.5.2 Greek Cypriot’s Position on Property Issues  
The economic calculation of Greek Cypriots related to three dimensions.  
 
-Compensation for properties that will not be returned to their legitimate 
owners and compensation to settlers who may wish to return to Turkey.  
 
-The reconstruction of cities like Famagusta 
 
-The monetary policy and its implementation at the central and the 
component state levels.”125  
                                           
123 Stelios Platis, Stelios Orphanides and Fiona Mullen, “the Property Regime in a Cyprus Settlement”, PRIO(Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo, 2006, p. 4 
124 UN. the Security Council, “Annan Plan V. the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”. Annex VII. Section 1 
and 23. 2004 
125 Coufoudakis and Kyriakides, supra note 61, p.10 
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Although the numeric data have been debated, it is obvious that a large number of Greek 
Cypriots should have left from their home, and the value of property they lost is an 
enormous sum of money which any part cannot easily compensate.  
“Between 162,000 and 170,000 Greek Cypriots fled from the north in 1974. Greek 
Cypriots say they left behind 46,000 properties and claim to have ownership rights 
over 78 per cent of the private land in the north. A Turkish Cypriot official 
estimated the surface area owned by Greek Cypriots is about 1.5 million Cypriot 
dönüms (about 2,000 sq km, 60 per cent of the 3,355 sq km currently under Turkish 
Cypriot control), of which Turkish Cypriots are using a very significant portion”126 
 
91% of Greek Cypriots claimed that the property lost by Turkish intervention should be 
restituted and individuals should regain their property right, while 52% of Turkish Cypriots 
opposed it.  
 
 
  
127
 
The Greek side opposed the Annan Plan’s proposals for property issues because of the system 
of deferred payments. “They also objected to applying derogations from the three freedoms 
of the EU acquis (the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute 
the body of European Union law), even though these would have been temporary.”128 The 
Greek Cypriots do not give a room to negotiate, and they want absolute reinstatement of their 
property, not part of them. As money is of primary importance in a capitalist society, their 
                                           
126 “Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide”, International Crisis Group, Europe Report, N.210, 2010, p. 2 
127 Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci, supra note 52, p.38.  
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attitudes are not changed. “A recent poll (2010) shows that 53 per cent of Greek Cypriots 
think that a property settlement must give iron-clad rights of restitution, while 49 per cent 
think the rights to live, work and exercise political rights anywhere in Cyprus also should be 
safeguarded.”129 Even though the Annan Plan was a considerable solution for property issues, 
Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan because they cannot leave their property rights to the 
uncertain future. They want a 100% guarantee of their property rights. 
 
4.5.3 Institution of Compensation Suit for International Court 
Greek Cypriots have not waited for reunification and governmental measures to solve their 
property issues. Greek Cypriots instituted compensation suits to the “Immovable Property 
Court (IPC)”130 and European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). This movement started from 
the case of ‘Titina Louizidou’.  
 
“In 1996, the ECHR asserted the right of Tattiana Louizidou to her property in 
Kyrenia (in the north) and ordered Turkey to pay some $915,000 in damages and 
costs. Turkey eventually paid around €1.2 million, including interest, in 2003. The 
ECHR has also found admissible over 30 cases from Greek Cypriots after Louizidou. 
The largest case to date is a class action against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots that 
seeks $400 billion, filed in the U.S. on 19 October 2009 by approximately 200,000 
displaced Greek Cypriot property owners.”131 
 
However, property issue has inevitable dilemma, that is, the right of present possessors. 
Although the ECHR has founded Turkish responsibility in dozens of cases, the ECHR also 
expressed clearly the rights of present owners.   
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“The courts are recognizing that long-term users also have rights and that individual 
owners should be able to voluntarily exchange properties. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) especially has been encouraging Cypriots to rely on 
domestic remedies, such as a Turkish Cypriot property commission to which several 
hundred displaced Greek Cypriots have already applied.”132 
 
Furthermore, compensation from the IPC cannot reach the need of Greek Cypriots. The 
interview of one IPC president shows well that using the IPC is also not be a desirable 
solution. Sümer Erkmen, past president of the IPC said,  
 
“People that took my property from me are supposed to decide how much they will 
give me. IPC is run by Turkish Cypriots; the two international members do 
nothing. I don’t trust [the IPC]. Greek Cypriots get only 10 or 20 per cent of the 
actual value of their properties. The IPC says take it or leave it”.133 
 
Finally, this is to sell their property rights dirt cheap, and to give up their opportunity that can 
assert the fair and independent Cypriot organization like the Governmental Council suggested 
by the Annan Plan. 
 
4.5.4 Solution and Unavoidable Sacrifice of Personal Interests 
After the failure of the Annan Plan, there have been new negotiations between the two 
Cypriots communities. “In the round of reunification talks underway since September 2008, 
the two leaders have agreed in principle to settle the property dispute through a mix of 
restitution, exchange and compensation.”134 However, this cannot be also an acceptable 
solution. At any rate, Turkish Cypriots have lived in the property that Greek Cypriots lost in 
1974. If Turkish Cypriot political leaders decide to deprive their rights of present occupation 
and to return it back to Greek Cypriots whether all or part, this measure cannot be accepted 
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by Turkish Cypriots occupying now. In the end, there should be compensation at the level of 
government, whether by a unified new government or the TRNC. Also, it should not be 
possible to demand compensation from Turkey or international organization. In this regard, 
Cypriots cannot help being burdened with compensation expense like the way of tax. From 
the lessons of German reunification, it can be found that the biggest obstruct of reunification 
is the expense of reunification, even without the compensation. “The cost of economic 
reunification would be born by the Greek Cypriots. The reunification cost has been estimated 
close to $20b, while the donors conference pledged about $750m. Turkey bore no financial 
liability for her actions in Cyprus since 1974.”135 I never deny the past property rights of 
Greek Cypriots, but it should be reconsidered the requirement for the full reinstatement of 
Greek Cypriots.  
The German case gives us valuable lessons for property issues. 15 June, 1990, the two 
German governments announced ‘the joint statement on the property issues’. This statement 
finalized the basic principals dealing with unsolved property conflicts. The main point of the 
statement was that the property expropriated by the East German government could not be 
handled in the same way as the property confiscated by the USSR was before the 
establishment of East German government.  
 
“The property expropriated by East German after 7th, Oct, 1949 should be returned 
to original owners, while the property confiscated by the military government of 
USSR could not be returned. As the preamble of statement revealed, this 
agreement came from the consideration that the infringement of property rights 
should not only be relieved by constitutional government, but also it should be 
prevented to threat the life basement of East German people who had lived for 40 
years, or the economic basement of East German.”136 
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University, 1999, p.9  
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What is different with the Cyprus case? That is apportionment of a loss. Cypriots should 
think of all Cypriots as a single company if they wish to march towards a bright future. A 
company or family should be able to share the pain and loss of reunification. In this regard, 
there is no solution which can guarantee iron-clad property rights. Cypriots must cooperate in 
order to solve this property issues.  
 ６８ 
4.6 Rejection following the Position of Politic Leaders 
It cannot be denied that the influence of political leaders was very critical for the choice 
of the people to choose to reject reunification. Tassos Papadopoulos, president of the 
Republic of Cyprus, in a televised speech delivered on the 7th of April 2004 called on Greek 
Cypriots to reject the plan, declaring ‘I received a state; I will not deliver a community’. Most 
of political parties like the Movement for Social Democracy – United Democratic Union of 
Centre, New Horizons, Fighting Democratic Movement and Ecological and Environmental 
Movement, also opposed the plan. Some members of the Democratic Rally split from the 
party and formed a new party named ‘For Europe’ which opposed the plan as well. Most of 
the political leaders of Greek Cypriots opposed the plan. As a result, it is natural that their 
vote depended strongly on their political ideas. For instance, “more than 90% of the Cyprus 
President supporters voted against the Annan Plan. On the other hand, the percentage of those 
who voted against the Annan plan among the voters of the rest candidates for the 2003 
presidential elections is lower.”137 There are arguments that some political leaders of Greek 
Cypriots supported Annan Plan and that the influence of the Papadopoulos speech was 
limited. Endorsement of the plan was voiced by Democratic Rally leadership and the United 
Democrats. Glafcos Clerides also supported the plan: “I am 85 years old. I would rather pass 
away, than seeing the end of fights of the Cypriot people.”138 Besides, “US Embassy and 
other polls one week before the president’s speech showed a 70% negative vote among Greek 
Cypriot voters.”139 However, the Greek political party in power had influenced the people to 
reject the Annan Plan already, and the change of the situation was beyond the ability of a few 
political groups.  
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Cypriots were deprived the opportunity to decide for themselves about the Annan Plan, 
because there was no information. Both Cypriots had limited information about the Annan 
Plan. There was no public debate over which Cypriots can appraise the plan. “Rigid deadlines 
on a complicated legal text of more than 9,000 pages. Most of the final text from Annan’s 
arbitration did not make it to the UN web site until a day before the referendum!”140  
As with the German case, desirable reunification cannot be accomplished by the public. 
However, but as mentioned in the introduction, a gradual consensual reunification in equal 
status by the negotiation of political leaders is the very desirable model. Therefore, the 
rejection of political leaders is a very critical factor. The leaders are elected by the people of 
the nation which means the people of divided countries should carefully select their leader to 
lead their country to reunification. 
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Chapter 5: Korean Reality in Comparison to Cyprus 
Cyprus has endeavored to find a solution and has experienced the referendum for 
reunification. This historical experience gives Korea precious lessons. Now, it is natural to 
examine how much Korea is prepared to accomplish its reunification by comparing it with 
Cyprus.  
 
5.1 North and South Korean Negotiation 
5.1.1 Balancing Diplomacy and Direct Negotiation with North Korea 
The Korean situation has a more complicated international environment. Whenever Korean 
problems are mentioned, the term of Six Party Talks is follows. Six Party Talks aim to find a 
peaceful resolution to the security concerns considering the North Korean nuclear weapons 
program. The members are the following: 
 
 The Republic of Korea (South Korea)  
 The People's Republic of China  
 The United States of America  
 The Russian Federation 
 The State of Japan  
 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
 
In other words, 4 super powers are interested in the Korean Peninsula. Nuclear weapon issues 
deprived the two Korea of the initiatives of negotiation. Although the super or regional power 
cannot be ignored, the issues relating with divided countries’ fate should be decided 
themselves. The Cyprus case shows well how external power controlled divided countries’ 
fate for their own benefits. “In order to attain peace and stability not only in the peninsula but 
in the region, Korea should be unified in a way that primarily reflects the wishes and interests 
of the Korean people of both sides, not those of the bigger powers.”141 Seeing the Cyprus 
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case of 1960, it is clear that unstable inner reconciliation can break reunification again. It is 
needless to say that stable reconciliation can be accomplished only when the two Koreas are 
satisfied, not an external power. Sometimes, Korean inner efforts to reconcile have been 
intervened and frustrated by external power. For instance, Bush, former president of USA, is 
a representative example.  
 
“The dramatic progress in reconciliation between the two Koreas after 
the June 2000 summit seems to have deteriorated again since the new Bush 
administration has advocated a hard-line policy toward North Korea. The 
reciprocal trip to Seoul by Kim Jong-il, which was initially expected in April 
2001, is now being delayed because of his protest against United States 
policy. The South Korean government had originally prepared to conclude a 
peace agreement with North Korea in the second inter-Korean summit. 
However, President Kim Daejung has apparently toned this down after his 
meeting with President Bush in March 2001”142  
 
The two Koreas must endeavor to continue negotiation without the interference of 
external power. One Korean President, Kim Young Sam, said that ‘no ally is more valuable 
than our own nation’ (that is, North and South Korea), underlining his commitment to deal 
with inter-Korean problems as a priority. On the other hand, North and South Korean direct 
negotiation has been also stopped by Korean governments. There is a Korean proverb which 
says, even if a man fight with his wife, they should sleep together in the same room. 
Unfortunately, present South Korean government stopped the direct negotiation with North 
Korea and depends on the negotiation with external powers like Six-Party Talks. It means 
that, although a wife is hateful, it is not desirable for both sides to cut off their 
communication. It should be remembered that the UN could not become a trouble-solving 
broker in Cyprus. South Korea suffered from armed provocations of North Korea, but Korea 
should continue their direct negotiation.  
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Additionally, North and South Korea should appear on the stage of negotiation as a host. 
The environment of direct negotiation can be constructed by balancing diplomacy. For 
example, nuclear experiments of North Korea can be a new motive for negotiation. South 
Korea should maintain a balance with super powers, and endeavor to open the way for direct 
negotiation with North Korea.  
The negotiations between North and South Korea have always been broken off by pre-
conditions.  Before any negotiation, North Korea has urged South Korea to accept the 
withdrawal of USA forces which are stationed in South Korea, while South Korea has 
demanded an apology from North Korea for military provocations in the past. Korea should 
learn how Cyprus began its negotiation. The ‘No Precondition’ principal of UN Resolution 
1250, in 1999, was the motive which made the two Cypriot communities appear at the 
negotiating table. Korea should restart its negotiation without any precondition.  
Lastly, it is a particular question when reunification will be accomplished. The desirable 
unification model is a gradual, consensual reunification by negotiation in equal status. In the 
negotiation, there should not be a dead line. A dead line can be a motive for negotiation, but 
it can also put an end to negotiation without any fruit. Moreover, an incomplete solution can 
lead to the confusion of the people.  
 
5.1.2 Communication with the People  
In many cases, the situation of a divided Korea has been used for political purposes. 
Negotiations with North Korea are always veiled by government as an issue of national 
security. Cyprus case shows well that procedural problems of negotiation come from lack of 
communication with the people. I think that there are only a few secrets which should be 
veiled in the negotiation between North and South Korea. However, government always 
announces only the result of negotiation. If the result is good, government carries on large 
 ７３ 
scale propaganda that the result was produced by the effort and ability of government. On the 
contrary, if the result is bad, every time, government was shifted the blame for the failure of 
negotiation onto opposite side. This is very similar to the Cyprus case. The Annan Plan was 
difficult for public people to understand, and political leaders even intercepted the 
opportunity for the people to understand through controlling public media. Furthermore, 
whenever the two Koreas conflict, an overall lull in negotiations was the only choice of 
government. Negotiation is just one step of the march to reunification, so the people of the 
nation have the right to see the process. As the Annan Plan was rejected by the people, a 
solution excluding the people’s opinion will be rejected by the people.  
 ７４ 
5.2 Will of Korean People for Reunification  
Without the will for reunification, nothing can be accomplished. Even if there is an absolute 
reunification plan, if the people do not want reunification, the reunification plan is worthless. 
How about the Korean case? Although the data of a North Korean poll is very rare, according 
to one research result:  
 
□ South Koreans were asked "whether they wish unification to be realized". The 
result showed that most of them, 83.4% agreed while only 14.6% of them 
answered they do not. The desire for the unification, therefore, turned out to be 
very high. 
□ While almost all, 98.9% of North Koreans answered they want unification and 
none of them stand against it. North Korean people appear to have more desire 
for unification.
143
 
 
Another South Korean research also shows that about 84% of South Koreans agree with the 
reunification.  
 
 
144
 
Even though 28.3% of South Korean people who disagree with reunification are important, 
but the people who agree strongly with reunification, is more important. Korea has divided 
since 1948. 64 years have passed since then. The dispersed family members who desire the 
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reunification most are dying from old age. South Korean people have more vested rights 
through economic development that they rarely want to be infringed by reunification. The 
people who strongly agree with reunification might be decreased in the future. Especially, the 
opinion of the young generation for reunification is anxious. According to a 2009 national 
poll, about 35.5% of South Korean youth (age between 19~40) are not interested in 
reunification.  
 
145
 
In the future, reunification will be an impractical matter for Korean people. Although 
reunification should be accomplished for the nation’s future, the motives for reunification 
come from the past time. Korean people should not forget how much they have suffered from 
their divided situation. Korea should end military conflicts. The property and vested rights 
could be demolished in 2 hours, if they have a 2
nd
 Korean War. This is an infallible reason 
why Korea should accomplish our reunification. Reunification problem should be discussed 
ceaselessly and the reasons why Korea should accomplish it should be taught to the younger 
generations.  
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5.3 Korean Debating for Political System 
5.3.1 UN Recognition of Each Korea 
A simultaneous recognition of the UN by the two Koreas can give good lessons to Cyprus. 
The Two Korea had conflicted on the legitimacy of state. However, this conflict was put an 
end by one South Korean President. To summarize the process of it:  
 
“The Roh(13th Korean President, 1988~93) Korean administration pursued 
so-called ‘A Northward Policy’ and succeeded in making diplomatic ties with 
Russia in 1990 and China in 1992, while North Korea had yet to normalize 
relations with the United States and Japan. These diplomatic ties were 
evaluated as a remarkable victory for South Korea over its northern 
counterpart. They also have important meaning in the sense that they helped 
to dismantle the Cold War structure on Korean peninsula. The division and 
confrontation between South and North had long been balanced and 
solidified while the South was allied with the United States and Japan and the 
North with Soviet Russia and China. In September 1991, South and North 
Korea were jointly admitted to the United Nations as new members.”146 
 
For 38 years, there has been no Korean state in the world which has been recognized by 
international society, because each Korea had insisted its governmental tradition and 
justification as the only state of Korea. Furthermore, there were furious oppositions for 
simultaneous accession of the UN, even in Korean inner society. They urged that it was an 
antinational way which divides Korea as two states, eventually. However, the South Korea 
government persuaded the opposition part that simultaneous accession is the shortest way for 
unification and that South Korea should acknowledge North Korea as equal. Finally, the UN 
security council, especially Russia and China recognized South Korea as a sovereign state. 
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North Korea is being ruled by a small group of leaders, a dictatorial regime. This group 
never wants to be deprived of their vested rights. Besides, radical reunification by their 
collapse is also not helpful for Korea. South Korea should accomplish its reunification by 
negotiation with this dictatorship. Therefore, South Korea should accept the North Korean 
government as a partner of negotiation. Kim-Il-Sung and his son, Kim-Jung-Il died. Now, his 
grandson, Kim-Jung-Eun is the new leader of the DPRK. South and North Korea should 
make a new history on the Korean peninsula with him. It depends on South Korean 
magnanimity whether the Korean peninsula will again be again stained with blood or not. 
 
5.3.2 Conflicting over Political System 
The Korean people lived together for 1269 years as the people of same nation; the first 
Korean unitary nation, “United Silla”147  was built in 676 and Korea was divided by 
occupation forces in 1945. The construction of unitary state seems natural, but the two 
Koreas are conflicting over political systems. North Korea and South Korea have insisted on 
different governmental systems. “North Korea insists that ‘the Federal Republic of Koryo’ 
would comprise one nation, one state, two systems, and two regional governments.”148 On 
the contrary, South Korea has insisted on a unitary state of Korea. There are three stages 
toward the accomplishment of unitary state.  
 
 Cooperation and Reconciliation Stage  
(Unitary state South Korea v. Unitary state North Korea)  
 Confederation Stage (Confederation Korea)  
 Unitary Stage (Unitary state Korea)  
 
                                           
147 In 660, Silla subjugated Baekje. In 668, Silla conquered Goguryeo to its north. Silla then fought for nearly a decade to 
expel Chinese forces on the peninsula intent on creating Tang colonies there to finally establish a unified kingdom as far 
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South Korea insists on one state, one system and one government. The two Koreas are in 
confrontation with contrary views. If the stages of reunification are arranged in a row based 
by the degree of unity the two Koreas insist on, we can realize that all of the governmental 
systems can be placed on one path.  
 
 
 
The North Korea government does not want Unitary State which can threaten its political, 
vested interests. The South Korean government insists on that Korea should accomplish a 
unitary state, because Korean people believe that they can integrate fully in politic, social, 
and cultural part. However, the Cyprus case tells us that the political system cannot be 
completed in the first step of reunification. If the united people want a unitary system, united 
Korea will be unitary state in the end, while, if a federation type of system would be more 
useful, a united Korea will keep the federal system. 
South Korea should not be too attached to the governmental system. It is enough that the 
two Koreas have the will of reunification and going ahead gradually after many trials and 
errors. Unless North Korea tries to absorb South Korea into their dictatorship, it is critical to 
begin with cooperation, not with deciding on a governmental system. 
Confederation                     (South) 
Cooperation and Reconciliation     (South) 
Soft Federation                    (North) 
Federation                        (North) 
Unitary                            (South) 
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One good suggestion for this process is a gradual regional unity like ‘Gae-song 
Industrial Region’. Gae-sŏng Industrial Region is a special administrative, industrial region 
of North Korea. With the effort of Ju-Young Jung, the first chairman of Hyundai (Korean 
enterprise), Gae-sung Industrial Region was formed in order to ease the military tension and 
to cooperate in economic part in 2002. Kaesong Industrial Park is being operated in the 
region, as a collaborative economic development with South Korea. It is located ten 
kilometers north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone with direct road and rail access to South 
Korea and an hour's drive from Seoul. Gae-song is the only region which South and North 
Korean people can contact daily and legally. This construction of a mutual city is one 
desirable solution which can solve the conflict and governmental disagreements. When the 
two Korea negotiated the issue of the Gae-song industrial region, they debated adjunctive 
problems like conflicts with governmental system. In the end, they concluded an agreement 
while leaving room to negotiate later. The Gae-song industrial region has been maintained 
even after the Bombardment of Yeon-Pyoung-Do. It stands to reason that this regional 
cooperation is helpful for the self-supporting economy of North Korea which can decrease 
the expense of reunification. South Korea should try to find the way in which it can unite 
gradually.  
 ８０ 
 
5.4 Self-reliance of National Defense and Foreign Forces 
5.4.1 Korean Security Environment 
Cyprus and Korea must accomplish the withdrawal of foreign forces and achieve the self-
reliance of national defense. How can Korea accomplish the withdrawal of foreign forces? 
Korea might be able to find the solution how to expelling the foreign powers, through the 
analysis of interested countries on the Korea peninsula. First of all, the USA is a sensitive 
country to Korean issue, “because these forces are vitally linked to the United States strategy 
of maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. If they are pulled out of the Korean 
peninsula, calls for similar troop withdrawals from Japan would likely gain momentum, 
which would eventually force the US to revise its security strategy for Northeast Asia.” 149 
The strongest and most hostile countries to the USA cluster in Northeast Asia. China, Russia, 
and North Korea have been the stronger enemy of USA than any past enemy such as Vietnam, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba, Libya, Panama, Granada, Palestine or Iran. However, the USA 
cannot easily keep North Korea in submission by the use of military forces because of an 
unyielding North Korea as well as China and Russia. Although the USA pretends to support 
real Korean independence, the USA always keeps watch on Korean affairs for its strategic 
interests to defense the extension of China and Russian power.  
The Chinese position is almost the same as the USA. “China apparently does not like 
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapon, which can easily trigger a chain reaction of 
similar activities in the region. In this sense, Chinese interests in Korea--a desire to avoid war, 
avoid collapse of North Korea and avoid nuclear proliferation--have been congruent until 
now.” 150 The positions of the USA and China for Korean reunification have similar aspects. 
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In the case of their balance of power, the two super powers do not want conflict, and they 
may also pursue the strategy of Korea as a buffer zone of their power. On the contrary, in the 
case of broken balance, the superior side may try to establish a friendly state by any method.  
Russia’s position and inner calculation is similar to the USA. Russia’s main strategy is 
“maintaining stability in Korea; establishing balanced relations with two Koreas; helping 
with inter-Korean dialogue; cooperating with other big powers in Korea; and opposing 
domination of the Korean Peninsula from external forces.” 151 Russia concentrates on getting 
economic profits in the economic cooperation between the two Koreas, including connecting 
the Korean railroads to the Trans-Siberia Railroad.  
However, another super power, Japan has a different intention with the reunification. 
Historically, Japan had taken neutral line between South and North Korea, but present 
Japanese position is different.  
“Since Japan is seriously worrying about the influence on Japan of the possible 
collapse of North Korea and war in the Korean peninsula, it watches the situation 
very closely. Especially, Japan’s greatest concern about North Korea is its missile 
program. Because of the American forces stationed in Okinawa, Japan sees itself as 
the number one target of a possible North Korean missile attack. It also worries 
about the impact of a possible North Korean collapse upon Japan, such as rush of 
refugees and demands for a Korean rehabilitation fund. About 100,000 North 
Koreans and their Japanese wives who returned to North Korea from Japan in the 
1960s still have family and relatives in Japan.”152 
  
Japan suspects that its best position regarding Korea’s reunification is opposition. With Korea 
divided, Japan can have a voice in Korean affairs. Japan expects that it would have an 
increase in conflicts with a unified Korea and that a decrease in its influence would be 
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inevitable. “Japan may not welcome a unified Korea with a population of seventy million and 
a fair amount of economic and military capability. The Japanese deny this, though they admit 
that they worry about the possible emergence of Korean nationalism.”153 
 
5.4.2 Solution for Self-reliance of National Defense 
It is natural that an independent nation should accomplish the self-reliance of national 
defense. For this, the withdrawal of foreign forces is necessary. In the position of North 
Korea, the withdrawal of USA forces is a necessary precondition. Although there is some 
opposition to the stationing of USA army, many South Korean oppose the withdrawal of USA 
forces due to mistrust of the North and fear of war. The South Korean people do not want the 
withdrawal of USA military without the confidence that North Korea will not make military 
provocation or event start war again. By Oct. 2011, USA forces of 26,000 are stationed in 
Korea. The USA forces have been stationed in Korea since 1945, although they withdrew for 
1 year (1949~1950). The withdrawal period caused the Korean War. This historical 
experience caused many South Koreans to rely on USA forces out of fear of war. On the other 
hand, this stationing of USA forces has also been the biggest obstruction of negotiations with 
North Korea. North Korea is afraid of the USA military, because it is a very powerful threat 
to their government.  
As a result, a prior question is when and how Korea can accomplish the withdrawal of 
USA forces and finding the way to accomplish the self-reliance of national defense. One way 
is to keep balance with external powers. Another is for the two Koreas to dissolve the state of 
tension gradually by direct negotiations. For instance, the two Koreas should change the 
Armistice Agreement to the Termination Agreement. Then, Korea should endeavor to 
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conclude a nonaggression treaty. Finally, if a mutual defense treaty is concluded, USA forces 
are no longer needed and should be removed. One suggestion of process for USA military 
withdrawal is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this process, it is important that the two Koreas should not be manipulated by external 
powers. The present Armistice Agreement was concluded by UN allied forces and South 
Korea did not agree to participate in the negotiation. Some people argue that the agreement of 
the USA is needed in order to conclude the Termination Agreement of War. This is an absurd 
idea. At that time, the South Korean government was opposed to the conclusion of the 
Armistice agreement. They chose not to be present at the Armistice meeting, leaving the 
burden of protecting South Korea on the USA. Korea cannot find the solution for the Korean 
peninsula from begging a super power’s help. The self-reliance of national defense cannot be 
accomplished by foreign forces. 
Termination Agreement 
Armistice agreement 
Nonaggression Treaty 
Mutual Defense Treaty 
Withdrawal of USA 
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5.5 Private Property Right vs. National Profits 
Since the Japan annexation of Korea in 1910, there has been disorder of property rights. 
Japan deprived many Koreans of their property rights. After Japan surrendered in 1945, USA 
military confiscated land and took compensation which it paid out and distributed to South 
Korea. At the same time, USSR confiscated land with no compensation and carried out free 
distribution. After that, the Korean War have broken out in 1950, and ended in 1953. The 
Korean War changed not only the border between South and North Korea, but also numerous 
land owners died and registration record of land was destroyed. Eventually, South Korea 
concluded the inner dispute by the Special Measure Law regarding the treatment of Land 
Reform Project 1968. Now, South Korea authorizes private property and land transaction, 
while North Korea forbids possession and transaction of land.  
Although the Korean property issue looks more serious than the Cyprus case, Korea does 
not have migration on a large scale like Cyprus. Furthermore, because of the utterly 
disordered situation arising from the Japanese Annexation and the Korean War, an individual 
owner cannot easily prove their property rights. It is a matter of course that private property 
right should be protected. However, far more individuals of the nation can suffer crisis due to 
a small population of original land owners. If an individual is too adamant in insisting on 
their property rights, government may choose to restrict private rights. 
Moreover, as Britain promised to assign its part of SBA to unified Cyprus in the Annan 
Plan V, Korea can find the solution to reunification expense from the different economic 
system. Firstly, government should compensate the original land-owner, but it should be 
limited to the cases in which the original owners can prove their property right. The cases that 
could be proved would be a few. Moreover, the appropriation standard of compensation 
should set prices at the basis of present land value in North Korea. Government would get 
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enormous financial benefits from this land, because North Korean real estate cannot help 
rising in price. The profits for all of people of the nation should have priority over minor 
interests. As the Annan Plan showed, profits from the absorption of the border between the 
two Korea, the DMZ (De-Militarized-Zone) can be used for reunification expenses. Property 
issues will not be an obstruction to reunification.   
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5.6 Korean Identity 
The ethnic sameness of Korean people cannot guarantee national reconciliation automatically. 
Reconciliation comes from respecting others as the same people. It is unclear whether the 
South Korean people are ready to accept the North Korean people as the same people. Even if 
reunification is accomplished and all Korean people come to live together, unless they make 
real reconciliation, reunification will be broken off again. Contrary to the Cyprus case, 
Korean people have high homogeneity in language, culture, religion, and race. The problem 
is with the gap of economics and education. In the capitalist society, the social status of one 
person is decided by his economic state. In order to raise the social status, education gives 
them very important opportunities. However, South Korea and North Korea have a big gap in 
economy and education. By 2010, the South Korean population is double of North, and GDP 
of the North Korea is less than 3% of South Korean. The total trade amount of North is just 
0.4% of South Korea. 
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There is also quite a large gap in education between North and South. Almost 80% of South 
Korean High school students go on to university, while only 22% of North Korean high 
school students go on to university.  
South and North Korean University Education 
Items South North 
Number of University Student 3 022 530 
Number of Middle/High school Students 3 851 2 394 
Rate of University students 78.4% 22.1% 
                                                        (Thousand) 
The achievement of University scholarship is very critical factor in deciding a person’s job. 
The above table shows well the reality of this gap between the two Koreas through seeing the 
above table. This gap is also shown well the data of people escaping from North Korea. 
Except for a few people, most of them are laborers or students. By 2006, if we see their job in 
North Korea, the unemployed including student or those of old age are “56.3%. Labors are 
36%, specialists like professors or doctors are 1.6%, soldiers are 0.4%, and artists are 0.4%.  
Data of Refugees from North Korea 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Person 583 1,138 1,281 1,894 1,383 2,018 2,544 2,809 2,927 2,376 18953 
Male 294 506 468 626 422 509 570 612 668 578 5253 
Female 289 632 813 1,268 961 1,509 1,974 2,197 2,259 1,798 13700 
                                                                         
”155 
It is natural that they cannot easily acclimate themselves to new capitalist society. According 
to recent public news, most North Korean refugees experience discrimination from the people 
of South Korea. Although economy and security are also important, reunification is 
completed by real reconciliation. South Korea is not prepared to accept North Korean people 
as the same people. Gradual integrity can be a solution which can decrease the economic and 
educational gap. Reconciliation begins with embracing North Korean refugees. If South 
Korean people cannot accept just only 20,000 North Korean refugees, the accomplishment of 
reunification with 30,000,000 North Korean people cannot be accomplished desirably. Korea 
should endeavor to decrease the gap between the two Korean people. 
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5.7 Significance of Political Leaders for Reunification 
The Korean case shows very well how much the situation of negotiation for reunification can 
be influenced by the political leaders. The first South Korean government had the Korean 
War with North Korea. It is needless to say that they could not help having a hostile 
relationship. Thereafter, the next South Korean government, military regime came into power 
through two coup d’etats. This military regime could not develop the relationship with North 
Korea because anti-communism was a national platform, and there are many military 
collisions between the two Koreas.  
However, the new Korean leader of the first politic party which accomplished the 
change of regime, Kim Dae-jung tried to make reconciliation between the two Koreas. 
Finally, the first summit meeting was held in Pyeong-Yang on 13
th
 June 2000. He abandoned 
past anti-communism and hostile attitude. He had headed the “Sunshine Policy”156 for 
reunification in spite of the opposition of conservatives. The sunshine Policy can be 
summarized as a word, ‘Compromise’. He asserted that South Korea should help North 
Korea and that Korean problems should be solved by Koreans, not foreign powers. He 
accomplished the symbol of cooperation between the two Koreas, Gae-Sung joint industrial 
district.  
This amicable mood disappeared after the conservative party’s taking over of the regime. 
The new conservative regime blamed ‘Sunshine Policy’. The new conservative regime asked 
preconditions of North Korea such as apology for military attack and a stop developing 
nuclear weapons just as Makarios insisted on the recognition of the TRNC as a precondition. 
At last, the two Koreas tore down the tower of cooperation that they had built for 10 years, 
                                           
156 The ‘Sunshine Policy’ was the foreign policy of South Korea towards North Korea until Lee Myung-bak’s election to 
presidency in 2008. Since its articulation in 1998 by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, the policy resulted in 
greater political contact between the two States; the two Korean summit meetings in Pyongyang (June 2000) which 
broke ground with several high-profile business ventures, as well as brief meetings of separated family members.  
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and produced tragic military conflicts again namely the “ROKS Cheonan sinking”157 and the 
“Bombardment of Yeon-pyeong”.158  
The military conflicts have always been repeated, but the aftermath of conflict was 
different depending on the leader’s policy. It depends on the policy of government whether 
the two Koreas will have amicable mood again or not. While the political influence of the 
North Korean people is limited because of the North Korean dictatorship, South Korean 
people can select their political leader by their will. This is the reason why the people of 
South Korea should be more prudent in selecting their political leaders.  
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Conclusion 
Divided countries sometimes forget why they should accomplish the reunification. Even 
though some people oppose it, it is only natural that divided countries should accomplish 
their reunification. Because reunification can end tragic military conflicts and can accomplish 
the self-reliance national defense through the withdrawal of foreign forces. Also, the people 
of divided country had lived together and had developed economy and culture. They are 
compatriots who can help each other like family. Compatriots are different with the foreign 
forces that are attached to their profits always. Especially, Korea should never forget the tear 
of dispersed family members who are dying with bitter regret. Furthermore, when the two 
Koreas become one, Korea will lead international society as a super power with the economic 
benefits of reunification.  
    However, the important thing is how the reunification should be accomplished. In other 
words, it is important which model of reunification can fulfill the purpose of reunification. 
The answer of this question can be found from the cases of Vietnam, Germany, and Yemen. 
Absorptive reunification brings many problems, and also radical reunification in equal status 
is not desirable. Finally, a gradual consensual reunification by negotiation in equal status is 
the desirable model of reunification which fulfills the purpose of reunification.  
    Cyprus is trying to accomplish the gradual consensual model, and shows well what 
problems can happen in the process of gradual reunification model. Especially, the Cyprus 
referendum 2004 shows well how the gradual consensual model can be frustrated by the 
people.  Annan Plan had pursued the gradual reunification model, but it did not overcome 
several critical faults. Except for the veiled greed of foreign powers, the Annan Plan was a 
reasonable and desirable solution. Nevertheless, the reason why the Annan Plan failed, was 
Cyprus’ politic leaders did not observe the principal of reunification negotiation, that is, 
‘gradual’ and ‘people’. 
 ９１ 
Negotiation does not mean that any part has to achieve all of its goals or force another 
part to obey its requests. Negotiation is just, step by step, through concession and 
comprehension, marching toward a brighter future. For gradual model, there should not be 
deadline for negotiation. Divided country should endeavor to continue their negotiation until 
each side build the strong confident. It might take more time of a generation. However, if 
they really want the prosperity of nation, divided countries should pursue ‘gradual’ and 
‘regional’ integration like Gae-sung Industry District. Although South Cyprus people rejected 
the Annan Plan due to the fear of 350 Turkish military, but they are being threatened by 
30,000 Turkish military now. They lost the chance that they can make Turkish military 
withdraw gradually. 
   Moreover, the leaders of divided countries should not forget the fact that the host of 
nation is the people, not political leaders. In order to accomplish real reconciliation, the 
people can accept the reunification plan and the opposite people. For this, politic leaders must 
communicate with the people. They should open the gate of negotiation and lift the veil of 
secret. On the other hand, people should also pay attention to select their political leaders. 
Cyprus shows well how the fate of divided country can be changed by political leaders. When 
people select a political leader, they should think the prosperity and reunification of nation, 
not private benefits and ethnic group.  
Korea should bear the Cyprus case in mind. Cyprus case gives Korea very definite 
lessons on how we should prepare for our reunification. Each Korean people should be 
interested in our reunification and have confidence in knowing why it should be 
accomplished. It is foolish fighting to conclude the political system of a united state, because 
the political system has been changed so many times by situation changes.  
Political integration does not automatically guarantee social reconciliation. The new and 
reasonable identity of the Korean people should be able to embrace South and North people. 
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Also, in the process of reunification, the sacrifice of the private population might be asked for 
national profits. Government must endeavor to protect people’s property rights and the 
people do not have to insist on their rights from egoistic greed.  
Nowadays, the two Koreas are at a loss as to which way we should go. The nuclear issue 
is making two Korean positions narrow more and more, while foreign powers are raising 
their voice. There is the only solution we can select. Two Koreas should hold out its hands in 
peace in order to start real negotiation directly. In the world, there is no external power which 
can solve our problem of reunification.  
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Maps of Divided Countries 
 
China and Taiwan 
 
Cyprus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South and North Korea 
 
 
England and Ireland 
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Photos of Korean Military Conflicts 
 
The raid of Cheong-Wa-Dae, 
the president residence (1968) 
North Korean special forces 
platoon of 31soliders infiltrated 
Seoul to kill VIPs in the 
government. 
 
The hijacking of a passenger 
airplane (1969) 
A South Korean civil aircraft was 
hijacked to North Korea. 51 people 
on board were released after 2 
months, except 12 people. They are 
being detained until now. 
 
 
The assassination of First Lady 
(1974) 
One North Korean terrorist tried to 
kill the President, Park-Jeong-Hee, 
but failed. A stray shot killed First 
Lady. 
 
The bomb terror of Myanmar 
(1983) 
An attempt to kill South Korea 
President visiting Myanmar 
failed. 17 VIPs in government 
died including the vice prime 
minister. 
 
Blasting of passenger airplane 
(1987) 
A North Korean woman agent blew 
up the KAL858 airplane.  
All passengers of 115 died,  
 
 
 
2
nd
 Yeon-Peong Battle (2002) 
 
South Korean Navy engaged with 
North Korean Navy who crossed 
the border. 19 died, 25 wounded, 
the North Korean patrol boat sank 
 
Cheon-An-warship Sink(2010) 
 
South Korean warship was sunk 
by torpedo in the South Korean 
territorial water. 40 people were 
killed 
 
 
Bombardment of Yeonpyeong, a 
Korean island (2010) 
On 24, Nov, 2010, North Korea 
shelled dozens of artilleries on the 
South Korean island and 4 people 
died including 2 civilians. 
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Major Person of Annan Plan Negotiation 
 
Kofi Annan 
a Ghanaian diplomat  
the 7
th
 of the UN (1997~ 2006) 
 
Alvaro de Soto 
a Peruvian diplomat 
the Secretary-General's Special 
Adviser on Cyprus 
 
George W. Bush 
43rd President of the USA from 
2001 to 2009 
 
Rauf Denktaş 
‘76~’05 President of North Cyprus 
 
Mehmet Ali Talat  
President of TRNC (‘05~’10) 
Prime Minister (‘04~’05) 
 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
Prime Minister of Turkey since 
2003 
 
Glafkos Clerides 
‘93~’03 President of South Cyprus 
 
Tassos Papadopulos  
the 5th President of Cyprus  
from 2003 to 2008 
 
Demetris Christofias 
President of Cyprus (‘08~’current) 
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Distribution Map of Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
(Before and After Turkish Military Intervention) 
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USA Military Presence in Asian-Pacific Region 
 ９９ 
Armistice Agreement of Korean War (1953) 
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